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CHRISTIAN CONSERVATIVES AN D
THE TOTA LITA RIAN CHALLENGE 1933- 1940'
An address broadcast by the BBC on 14 July 1940 contained the following passage:
And now it has come to us to stand alone in the breach, and face the worst that the
tyrant's might and enmity can do. Bearing ourselves humbly before God, but
conscious that we serve an unfolding purpose, we are ready to defend our native land
against the invasion by which it is threatened. We are fighting by ourselves alone: but
we are not fightingfor ourselves alone. Here in this stro ng City of Refuge which
enshrines the title-deeds of human progress and is of deep consequence to Christian
civilisation ... here ... we await undismayed the impending assault. I
The grandiose, defiant, tones were characteristic of the speaker - but the imagery was not.
Before 1940 Churchill rarely presented resistance to the totalitarian regimes in Christian terms .
He had declared during the House of Commons debate on the Munich agreement in October
1938 that 'there can never be friendship between the British democracy and the Nazi power,
that power which spurns Christian ethics, which cheers its onward course by a barbarous
paganisrn? But his opposition to German ambitions from 1933 onwards had been expressed
overwhelmingly in terms of relative military strengths, British safety and independence, and the
continental balance of power.' Only gradually from 1935 did he add a further range of
appeals, and only during 1938 did he begin to do so with some regularity. Against Nazi and
Communist ideologies he contrasted the British 'ideology' of 'freedom, ... a liberal
constitution , ... democratic and Parliamentary Government, ... Magna Carta and the Petition of
\
Right': ' As the need for labour co-operation in rearmament became manifest and later as he
himself sought Labour party sympathy, he spoke of preserving the opportunities created by
modern science for improved, easier and more equal conditions for the 'broad, toiling masses'.'
On those occasio ns when he did appeal to 'moral and spiritual ideas' or to a 'cause' greater than
that of the British nation alone - even, on the outbreak of war in September 1939, to 'all that is
2most sacred to man' - he meant the essentially secular values of the League of Nations
Covenant, the 'standards of Law, ofJustice and of Freedom', and the rights of the individual."
Churchill was not a Christian, even though he conformed to the Church of England. He
had some sense of ,God' and 'Providence', but if this amounted to any faith beyond
'evolutionary materialism' it was 'Gibbonian deism' - or perhaps more precisely belief in a
'Churchillian Deity', which through the agencies of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough in
the 1700s, Randolph Churchill in the 1880s and himself in 1940, reached out to embrace the
destiny of Britain and its Empire." When he repeatedly invoked Christian faith during 1940,'
he did so not from personal conviction but as a rhetorician . He drew upon the most powerful
language available to sharpen and solemnize the confrontation with Germany, to inspire the
British nation and the self-governing Dominions to renewed determination, and to strengthen a
moral appeal for assistance from the United States. He was also responding to deep
movements in public feeling. Britain was still a broadly Christian society, even iffor most this
took the form of strong ly-held 'marginal Christianity' rather than active church membership."
Faith in God's power of intervention and mediation in human affairs remained part of official
belief. The imminence of war during the Czechoslovak crisis had brought unusually large
numbers of people into churches and chapels for prayers of penitence and intercession. Under
the leadership of the Archbishop of Canterbury and with the King's public approval all British
churches, Established, Free Church and Roman Catholic, had observed a Day of National
Prayer (18 September 1938) and after the Munich settlement - interpreted as an answer to
those prayers - a Day of Thanksgiving (2 October).'? Over the next two years successive
international crises were marked by similarly large church attendances led by national and civic
leaders on further national Days of Prayer, declared by the King-in-Council - an act of state -
after the outbreak of war (I October 1939), or less formally at the King's 'desire' during the
campaign in France (26 May 1940) and to mark the first year of war (8 September).' ! During
the desperate summer months of 1940 religious language acquired a vigorous public currency,
and not just among believers. Reinforced by the August J939 pact between the atheistic
dictatorships of Communist Russia and Nazi Germany, the war was commonly presented not
just as a fight for British independence or human freedom but as a defence of Christian
3civilisation. For many, the fall of France. leaving Britain 'standing alone', seemed to confirm
that the Brit ish nation had been charged by God with a special mission in the world.12
If Churchill's choice of rhetoric in 1940 confirms that Christian faith remained a central
element in British public values , were there other leading Conservative politicians and
government ministers, undoubted Christians, who had earlier offered Christian responses to
totalitarianism? If so, did these have significant effects upon events? Such questions have
hardly ever been asked, yet once raised they begin to reveal new dimensions to familiar
political episodes.
It is well understood that the threat of war, onset of rearmamem and the Nazi and Soviet
religious persecutions caused great moral perplexity and spiritual anxiety among many British
Christians, most obviously the clergy and religious pacifists. It is also known that during the
Czechoslovak crisis the churches' desire for peace was so strong that almost all their leaders
fervently supported Chamberlain's policy of appeasement and the Munich agreement. 13 Yet as
it affected British politicians, the international crisis of the 1930s is normally considered only
as a matter of diplomatic, military and economic assessments, as practical and material
expediencies rather than anything felt and articulated in ideological and moral, let alone
religious, terms.I " True, a few leading politicians were such prominent lay churchmen that the
fact has to be noted, but if this goes beyond simple use of the epithet 'Christian' their religion is
generally treated as somehow separat e from, or an encumbrance upon, their politics. Insofar
as religion is recognised as a political element in the 1930s it is associated chiefly with
criticism of the government, whether from within the Labour and Liberal parties or from
members of the League of Nations Union and the Peace Pledge Union. But did not
Conservative members of the government offer Christian answers to such Christian critics?
There is also a wider issue: the nature of the interwar Conservative party's popular appeal
and electo ral success. This has usually been interpreted in socio-economic or class terms, or
more successfully as ideological manipulation of such interests, with a 'gendered' appeal -
success among the new female electo rate - as a more recent addition .IS But Conservatism had
always existed in several forms, and these further Conservative arguments require
investigation if the party's interwar dominance and the nation's wider political culture are to be
4properly understood. Alongside the constitut ional and histori cal. the loyalties to family,
locality, nation and Empire, conception s of 'national character' and the ethic of 'service', there
were also appeal s to spiritual values."
This article proceeds by identifying prominent Christians in the Con servative party and the
National government, but also the dilemmas which inhibited most of them from expressing
extended religiou s and moral criticism of nazism and fasc ism. It then considers two leading
Conservative who did confront these dilemmas and publicly art iculated form s of 'Christian
Conservative' resistance to totalitarianism, if at first carefully defined and delimited. It
examines the remarkable interest of these and numerous other public figures in a controver sial
Christian revivalist movement. Finally, it assesses whether recognition of a Christian
Conservative rhetoric and spiritual concern can help explain certain crucial aspects of British
politics and policy in the 1930s .
* * *
The upper reaches of the Conservative party and National government contained more than
the one or two individuals commonly noted as 'Christian'; it included others who exceeded
conventional conformism in thei r manifest devotion, lay churchmanship, or readiness to
introduce religious dimension s into public discus sion. Among the anti-appeasers after Mun ich
were members of the Cecil family - Lords Cecil, Cranborne, Wolmer and, behind the scenes,
Salisbury - and also Lord Lloyd and Ronald Cartland, all in some senses 'Christian idealists "!"
Chamberlain's Cabinet contained equally committ ed Christians.18 These included Inskip, not
ju st Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, but also a lay leader of evangelical Anglicanism,
president of the National Church League, Church Pastoral Aid Society, Cru saders' Union,
YMCA, and Lord's Day Observance Society, who in J936 declared Sunday observance to be
'one of the many blessings which had made Great Britain a power in the world'.19 Hoare had
first risen to prominence as an Anglo-Catholic campaigner for ecclesiastical causes, notably in
resistance to disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Wales but also for assistance to the
Greek Orthodox Church and on committees for the Eastern Churches and Redemption of St.
5Sophia.P? Lord Zetland, a forme r Indian governor, had developed an inte rest in comparative
religious studies'! Earlier the Cabinet had included two other prominent Anglican laymen:
Ormsby-Go re (another member of the extended Cecil family) and Percy, a contributer to the
1924 Conference on Christian Politics. Economics and Citizens hip." There were also three
active Free Churchmen the Conservative Kingsley Wood and the Liberal National Runciman
served on national committ ees of Methodism, while anot her Liberal National, Ernest Brown,
was a Bapti st lay preacher and treasurer of the Free Church Federal Council.
Several of these clearly were exercised by the moral and religious challenge from the
total itarian states, as well as the military threat. A view that thes e regimes manifested pagan
'forces of darkness' and that Hitler in particular was 'anti-Christ incarnate', was fundamental to
the reservations or repugnance which all Cecils felt towards government foreign policy at
various times. Lord Cecil's dedication to the League of Nations and the League of Nations
Union was rooted in a sense of religious duty, of having 'been "called" to preach the League
spirit in public affairs'<' Cartland's ardent sense of 'the battle ... between Tot alitarianism and
Christianity' led him to such bitter criticism of the government that in Augus t 1939
Chamberlain encouraged moves to have him de-selected as a parliamentary candidate.>'
Among ministers, Zetland reflected privately on the challenge to the mind of Christendom
from the 'pagan philosop hy' and 'misapplied Darwinism' ofGermany." Others showed
concern for Christian solidarity . Ormsby-Gore, like other Cecilians once a fierce adversary of
Liberal nonconformists, revealed an important shift in the character of Conservative politics
when arguing in 1935 for Brown's promotion to the Cabinet: 'he and his wife are the salt of the
earth as the best type of bible loving nonconformists .... I know that in the ultimate crisis we
may all have to face some day, he'll have no use for the nee-paganism of Germany & what its
triumph may mean in the world' .26 Asthe Czechoslovak crisis developed, lnskip and two
Cabinet colleagues, the Conservative W.S.Morrison and Natio nal Liberal Burgin, joined the
Conserva tive anti-appeaser Amery, the Labour pacifist Lansbury and 173 other MPs of all
parties prot esting against a congress of the World Union of Freethink ers in London, signing a
'Manifesto of Witness' which proclaimed that 'in these momentous days when conflict and
anxiety prevail on every side', the 'hope of the world' lay in the freedom and the practice of
6truth and justice brought by recognition of the Fatherhoo d of God and the brotherhoo d of
man" Hoare declared in November 1937 that 'the forc es of brutality and materialism will ...
gain if we fail to make use of the one invincible weapon of religion that we pos sess against
them> Percy revealed a little more. 'To Toryism', he wrote in 1935, 'more than to any other
school of political thought, "totalitarianism" is, in principle, fundamentally repugnant'. This , he
argued, was because 'Toryism' derived ultimately from 'the first commandment of the Mosaic
Law', which was 'the original chart er of free thought' and because it understood that the
motive force for human progress lay 'not in the compulsory authority of the State, but in the
individual's conscience and sense of duty'."?
Much of this, however, consisted of private comments, sporadic surfacings of per sonal
faith or occasional qua si-academic statements . Those by Cabinet ministers help confirm, if
furt her confirmation is needed, that appeasement of Germany was not based upon sympathy
with nazism. But none amo unted to public creation of a Christian Conservative per spective.
Why did these politicians not express the ir abhorrence of to talitarianism more explicitly? The
answers lie in the familiar perplexities of Briti sh responses to the continental dictato rships,
probably felt more acute ly by Christ ian Conservatives than by less religiously-minded
ministerial and part y colleagues . Like many church leaders, some Christian Conservat ives
thought there were religious as well as socio-economic reasons for regarding nazism and
fascism, however unpleasant, as less horrible than communism, because less directly anti-
Christi an in propaganda and policies. There was a belief that they had emerged largely as
reactions to communism: without communism, there might have been no nazism or fascism.
In 1935 Inskip endorsed a lurid popular religious tract which located the source of
international anti-religious influences squarely in Moscow.'? While Cecil considered
communism a lesser threat than fascism (given the Soviet Union's ent ry into the League of
Nations in 1934) and thought actions by the Franco forces showed that 'not only democracy
but Chr istianity is on trial'; ' I the views of Cabinet members on the Spanish civil war were close
to those of back bench Conservative members of the 'United Christian Front' v? that here at
least, fascism in resisting communism acted as a defence for Christianity . Inskip was sensitive
to the German government's interference with the Lutheran church, but was as confused by the
7complicated nature of the German church struggle and as deflected by Nazi reassurances as
were most British church leaders - and like other Conservative politicians much less inclined to
make it into a public or diplomatic issue. In early 1938 he declined to join a church protest
against the arrest of Niernoller because he 'recognised that he was having a trial according to
... German law and I felt it would be out of place for me to protest'. Like Archbishop Lang he
warned Ribbentrop that Niernoller's imprisonment in a concentration camp, despite his legal
acquittal, was a 'great shock' to British opinion;" but neither turned their distaste for German
religious persecution - including persecution of Jews - into grounds for criticising
Chamberlain 's foreign policy.
The larger answer is that until 1939 all Christian Conservat ive judgements on
totalitarianism remained subordinate to what they regarded as a still more serious plight: the
risk of war. None was a pacifist; from early 1934 they accepted the need for rearmament.
Nevertheless for them as for almost all British churchmen, the enormous losses of the Great
War - moral and spiritual as well as human and material - had deepene d a belief that general
war, except in the most extreme circumstances, offended against God's will. Consequently the
policy of appeasement easily seemed to express the Christian injunctions, as was shown by the
British churches' earnest support and thanksgiving for Chamberlain's efforts during the
Czechoslovak crisis - even though an obvious outcome of the Munich agreement was to
expose many more people in central Europe to 'paganism' and persecution] ' The priority
given to peace, and consequently to avoiding inflammation of diplomatic relations, also
explains why many Christian Conservatives were as cautious about presenting a religious-
based criticism of totalitarianism as other Conservatives were to introduce ideological
criticisms. Churchill was as concerned as Cabinet ministers to deny that Britain intended any
interference with the internal government of other countries: there was 'no question of
resisting Dictat ors because they are Dictators, ... but only if they attack other people '."
Indeed the totalitarian challenge raised such delicate moral and spiritual prob lems, especially in
relation to rearmament and amidst strong church and chapel opinion, that few Conservative
politicians could feel confident in addressing them directly in public." It may also be that
8some Christian Cabinet minister s felt the task was being adequately performed by more senio r
colleagues.
* * *
The most prominent lay churchman in Chamberlain's Cabinet, the one invariably ident ified by
historians as Chri stian, was Lord Halifax . He was not, however, the first to offer a substantial
Chri stian Conservative respon se to totalita rianism. This came from Chamberlain's predecessor
as prime minister, Stanley Baldwin.
Since 1922 Baldwin had established an unusual political perso nality. In party and
ministe rial speeches which commonly reached beyo nd the policies and tactics of the moment,
and by many osten sibly non-p olitical add resses to non-polit ical audiences, he expressed a
preoccupation with pub lic values which drew, among other sources, upo n a deepl y-felt broad
church Anglicanism. By the quality, simplicity and power of his languag e and messages he
had become a highly successful public moralist, so masterl y that he could fuse non-partisan
values with Conservative part y interests withou t much of his audience noticing, and thereby
co mmand wide cross-party adrniration.l? By 1933 he had seen off the challenges of the
General Strike, Lloyd George' s Liberal part y, the 'press lords', and the Labour party. But
during his holiday rumination s in Aix-les -Bains that summer he identified a new threat:
'walking alone among these hills I have co me to the co nclusion the wo rld is stark mad .... I
th ink we are the sanest but the disease is catching'<" This madness was not just the
resumption of foreign rearmament and inte rnational aggr ession . Earlier than most other
British po liticians , he grasped the shared featu res of Hitler 's Germany, Stalin's Russ ia and
Mu ssolini 's Italy and identified a single monstrosity - what he usuall y called 'dictatorship', but
which he learned by 1935 to describe also as 'totalitarianism'. In them he perceived extreme
forms not simply of a political challenge but of a moral affliction creat ed within all societies by
the accelerated changes brought by the Gre at War : acceptance that the best opinions were
popular opinions, however uninfo rmed, crude and brut ish the se might be; belief that all
problems could be so lved by the state; obsession with materi al advance, and unq uestioning
9faith in the power of science. From these flowed the perversion of education and the new
electrical media into instruments for creating a servile 'mass mind'; the erectio n of an
'idolatrous conception of the state', and an acceptance that governments were justified in
manipulating societies and human nature as if they were machines, moulded by regimentation
or force for some supposed collective good. Seen in these ways, the military and ideological
threats from the fascist and communist powers were manifestations of a deeper spiritual crisis.
As he said in December 1934, 'the great danger that faces humanity to-day is the danger of the
loss offreedom'. Soon 'from the Rhine to the Pacific there will be a people running into
millions who have been trained to be either Bolshevik robots or Nazi robots' .'?
For so experienced and successful a political leader as Baldwin, such perceptions were
inseparable from con siderations of public thinking and government strategy. He declared the
threat to be not just external, but potentially internal to Britain. In the modern world, with
faster communications and with unsophisticated and impatient electorates, ideas passed with
'lightning rapidity' between nations: 'there are no ideas ... that may not spread thro ugh this
country as through others. No country is immune'.40 Britain had to establish a moral and
ideological resistance to totalitarianism. There were obviou s partisan applications. From
1933 to mid 1935 he used anti -totalitarianism as a means to justify perpetuation of the
National government, and to attack not only the political 'extremes' of Mosley's British Union
of Fascists and Cripps's Socialist League but also a Labour opposition which since 1931 had
turned sharply towards the left . But there were also larger, 'national', potentialities. After the
collapse of the Disarmament Conference in late 1933 , Baldwin knew that Britain had to create
an armed deterrence. His presentation of rearmament was as indicative of his ideological and
moral concerns as it was of his sensitivity toward s the strength of peace and disarmament
opinion among the electo rate . When 'rom Jones the official suggested that he shou ld 'impress
the country with the gravity of the situation and make them realise that we seem to be shaping
tor another war', Baldwin the politician replied: 'I would not put it that way. I would say that
we are the only defenders left ofliberty in a world of Fascists ';! ' Given the widesp read belief
that balance-of-power thinking, alliance systems and an arms race had 'caused' the Great War
and that another war against Germany might begin with a 'knock-out blow' - aeria l explosive
10
and gas bombardment of British cities - Baldwin. unlike Church ill, did not think that popul ar
accep tance of rearmament could be achieved by using the language of power politics. nor
by elaborating upon the still uncertain character of the German military threat. These might
well be counter-productive, scaring a volatile electorate 'into fits' and strengthening the anti-
rearmament opposition groups ." Instead he spoke of repairing 'deficiencies in defence ', and
enveloped rearmament in a positive ideological teaching. As the international situation
continued to deteriorate and a need for greater rearmament, requiring co-operation from the
trade unions and Labour pan y, became obvious, from May 1935 he shifted his anti-
total itarianism towards appeals for recogn ition of shared national interests and values. Now
the Labour movement was celebrated as 'a bulwark of popu lar liberty' against communism and
fascism."
From mid 1933 Baldwin's speeches therefore presented a sustained defence of democracy
against dictat orship. During even routine party speeches he would say: 'I would like before [
sit down to say a word about freedom'. He rooted democratic freedoms panly in specifically
British traditi ons - in 'Whiggish' constitutionalism and history, and romantic stereotyp es of the
national character - but also in general political principle and, increasingly and most
fundamentally, in religion. At the Congress on Education for Democracy in New York in
August 1939, he declared:
[ would always stress the spiritual rather than the political foundations of democracy.
It is a recognition of the dignity of man and of his individuality, and that dignity and
individua lity are his as a child of God There is the unbridgeable gulf between ...
democracy and the isms that are for the time being in control of so large a pan of
Europe.' !
An insistence upon Christian faith as the ultimate source and safeguard of freedom had long
suffused his speeches. While sharing the characteristic Conservative attitudes that communism
,
was worse than fascism and nazism, and that Mussolini and Hitler were checks upon Stalin, he
was not deluded about the character of the Italian and German regimes, nor the German
church struggle. Nazis as well as communists persecuted religion because by doing so they
struck at the foundations of individuality, liberty and brotherhood: 'if freedom has to be
abolished and roo m has to be made for the slave state, Christianity must go because slavery
1I
and Christianity cannot live together'. The great question had become 'whether the civilisation
of Europe ... was to be a Christian civilisation or a pagan civilisation'." His annual addresses
as Grandmaster of the Primrose League reveal this developing emphasis. Since the mid 1920s
he had routinely expounded Conservative doctrine as based upon the three 'Disraelian'
precepts of constitution, Empire, and the welfare of the people. But in 1935 he added 'the
maintenance of religion', and in 1936 promoted this to first place." By the time he retired
from government in May 1937, he had come to regard these themes as his political testament:
The torch I would hand to you ... is a Christian truth re-kindled anew in each ardent
generation. Use men as ends and never merely as means; and live for the brotherhood
of man, which implies the Fatherhood of God. The brotherhood of man to-day is often
denied and derided and called foolishness, but it is, in fact, one of the foolish things of
the world which God has chosen to confound the wise, and the world is confounded by
it daily.
We may evade it, we may deny it; but we shall find no rest for our souls, nor
will the world until we acknowledge it as the ultimate wisdom . That is a message I
have tried to deliver as Prime Minister in a hundred speeches....~7
Yet despite his criticism of totalitarianism, Baldwin insisted that the chief aim of British
policy had to be peace. The purpos e of rearmament was strictly deterrence and defence, not
preparation for an armed crusade. Britain had no ambition to change the government of any
other country; it should remain neutral in Spain; democratic and totalitarian states could co-
exist: There were limits to Christian solidarity. Speaking privately in July 1936 Baldwin said
he would not mind too much if Germany expanded to the East, because if there had to be war
in Europe it should be betw een the totalitarian powers, the 'Bolshies' and the 'Nazis'. Only if
Hitler went 'stark mad' and attacked the Low Countries and France should Britain think of
going to war: otherwi se he was 'not going to get this country into a war with anybody for the
League of Nations or anybody else or for anything else'." This attitude derived not just from
reaction to the Great War, but also frdrn expectation of still greater slaughter in a future war
ofbombardment of civilians. While studying air raid precautions in 1935 he had, he told the
House of Commons:
been made almost physically sick to think that I and my friends and the statesmen in
every country in Europe, 2,000 years after our Lord was crucified, should be spending
our time thinking how we can get the mangled bodies of children to the hospitals and
how we can keep the poison gas from going down the throats of the people."
12
This was not humanitarian revulsion alone. The Great War, he sometimes said, had been a
'great sin', which had unleashed 'the manifest forces of Satan': mankind was having to atone for
that sin in the economic, social and political ravages of the post-war world50 He repeatedly
declared that the Great War had shaken civilisation, and that a second war of scientific
barbarism would 'be the end of civilisation'." During the Czechoslovak crisis he was a
Chamberlainite, and afterwards went so far as to tell the House of Lords that if there 'were a
95 per cent chance of war ... I would hold to the [remaining] 5 per cent till I died'. In the
delivery of Hitler's invitation to the Munich conference he felt - as did Archbishop Lang and
other witnesses of the overwrought House of Commons scene on 28 September - that the
world's prayers had been answered , 'as though the finger of God had drawn the rainbow once
more across the sky and ratified again His Covenant with the children of men'5 2
During the international crises of the 1930s Baldwin found solace and strength in prayer
and providentialist faith. As he felt especially after Dunkirk and the fall of France, the
operations of Divine Providence had become peculiarly inscrutable; yet even the evils of
tota litarianism could be part of God's purpose, and in summer 1940 he shared the view that
the defeats of continental democracies seemed to demonstrate that Britain had been chosen as
the special instrument of His will5 3 Although he had not earlier thought it Britain's role to
fight a war, since 1933 he had declared its chief internationa l function to be that of supplying
inspiration and hope to the oppressed peoples of continenta l Europe: 'saving ourselves to save
the world at large'>' Here, well before 1940, was a conception of the British people's special
responsibility for preserving Christian liberties: as 'the home of freedom ' Britain formed 'a
tremendous stronghold to the slave state spreading westwards', and had a solemn duty to
provide 'spiritual leadership' to the world.'>
* >:t: *
Baldwin also became associated with another indication of Christian Conservative anxiety and
faith. The public figures who from the mid 1930s became associated with or interested in
Buchman's Christian evangelist movement, the Oxford Group, were remarkable in their
13
number and eminence: clergymen, sportsmen, trade union ists, businessmen, academics,
military officers, society hostesses, civic leaders, peers and politicians. In June 1939 236 MPs
of all part ies signed a message of support for Buchman's campaign in the United States: 'There
is urgent need to acknowledge the sovereign authority of God in home and nation, to establish
that liberty which rests upon the Christian responsibility to all one's fellow men, and to build a
national life based on unselfishness, unity and faith'56 Among the most active of these figure s
was Lord Salisbury. In October 1936 he arra nged a weekend meeting at Hatfield House
during which Buchman and his close advisors explained his teac hings to a group of Anglican
Cabinet ministers, ex-ministe rs, imperial proconsuls, peers and MPs, including Halifax, Cecil,
Wolmer, Percy, Lytton , Goschen, Bernays, Cazalet and Sankey, MacDonald's Lord
Chancellor.57 During 1937 Salisbury gave public support for the Grou p, and was jo ined by the
Baptist Cabinet minister Ernest Brown: it was rendering 'the greatest possible service ... to the
nations at this critical time'.5" Another Hatfield participant and public supporter was
Davidso n, Baldwin's close friend, a former Conservative party chairman and until May 1937 a
junior minister. Through Salisbury, Davidson and family members, Baldwin was drawn into
contact with the Group. He declared himselfprofoundly' interested by Salisbury's report of
~he Hatfield discussions, and in December 1936 invited Buchman to explain his work to him at
Chequers.>? Thereafter Gro up leaders and activists made persistent efforts to persuade
Baldwin - described by Buchman as the 'Abraham Lincoln of this generation' - to become in
his political retirement the 'autho ritative voice in the spiritual rebirth of the Empire'60
The Oxford Group was controversial, not least in its uncertain relationship to the churches
and in its leader being an enigmati c American. For leading Conservatives to have been
interested in such an unorthodox movement testifies to their sense that a spiritual crisis had
been reached. Many shared the reservations of the Group's clerical critics : its lack of theology
and institutionalised authority, its practice of public confession and its emotiona l style, and its
activists ' assumed familiarity with God and often embarrassi ng earnestness, naivety and self-
satisfaction."! They also disliked its importuning and flattery of themselves and other public
fig ures, and its use of the names of such figures for its own purposes. Baldwin and Inskip
bot h withdrew from its Royal Albert Hall meeting in July 1936 when their intended private
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attendance was publicised, and Baldwin declined later invitarionss- Even so Christian
Conservati ves were impressed, because in several respects the Group appeared to 'hold out
some hope of a remedy' for the 'present state of the world' . It had extraordinary success,
exceeding that of the churches, in converting many people and especially the young to active
Christian belief and conduct It placed great emphasis upon individuals and personal
relationships rather than the state as the source of improvement in communities and nations.
In reaching across denominat ional, social and industrial divisions, it appeared to promote
social harmony and promise that 'violent antagonism in politics' would be 'softened or swept
away'<' Although Cecil, at least, remained troubled on the issue, most were reassured by
Buchman's explanations of his associations with German leaders and of his notorious reported
(he claimed misunderstood) statement in August 1936 - 'I thank heaven for a man like Adolf
Hitler' - the more easily because , without the positive emphasis, they sympathised with his
qualifying clause, that Hitler had 'built a front line of defense against the anti-Christ of
Communism'64 The more immediate attractions were, first, that the Group seemed a vigorous
force against the materialism, immorality and irreligion which these politicians believed to be
at the root of all totalitarianism, nazi, fascist and communist. Second, with its reputed large
numbers of supporters in continental European countries and influence among their statesmen
and royalty, it appeared to have potent ial as an international movement helping to preserve
peace . As Salisbury, Brown and Davidson wrote in a public letter published by The Times in
August 1937, the Group's success in inspiring 'loyalty to ... the spirit and principles of Christ'
might with the help of rall the Churches of Christendom' provide the 'effective unifying or
harmonizing principle' - a 'Christian Front ' - needed to overcome the 'disunity of aim and
conflict of interest that now disturbed all human life and relationship s' and was 'the greatest
menace to modern civilization'<' Buchman himself adopted a broader purpose in May 1938,
renaming his movement 'Moral Re-Arrnament', and as the Czechoslovak crisis developed a
series of collective public letters from prominent sympathisers began to be published in leading
newspapers. This stimulated wider correspondence and comment on the contribution of
Christianity to the solution of national and international problems which continued through the
autumn . The first public letter came from thirty-three !vIPs, including Wolmer and sixteen
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other Co nserva tives.w The second and most publicised was organised by Salisbury.
Challenging Baldwin to act upon his repeated call for 'spiritual leadership', he wrote that 'many
of us are terrified at the crumbling of civilization, ... and ... are convinced that policy, however
skilful and honest, is not sufficient to save us from catastrophe': it was necessary to tap 'the
deeper springs of human motive'f? With war appa rently imminen t in early September 1938 ,
Baldwin responded by jo ining Salisbury and his group of eminent pee rs, ex-government
ministers, ret ired military chiefs, and academics in an appeal in The Times - much repri nted,
trans lated into other languages and circulated across Euro pe - for accepta nce of moral and
spiritual rearmament as the fundam ental force for peace.
Go d's living spirit calls each nation, like each individual to its higher destiny, and
breaks do wn the barriers of fear and greed, of suspicion and hatred . This same Spirit
can transcend conflicting political systems, can reconcile order and freedom, can
rekindle true patriotism, can unite all citizens in the service of nations, and all nations
in the service of mankind 'Thy Will be done on earth' is not only a prayer for guidance,
but a call to action. For His Will is our Peace.ss
While Salisbury and Group leaders hoped the letter wo uld be read by German leaders ,
Baldwin doubted the likelihoo d of immediate effects: 'J don't thin k it can do any good but it is
a voice from England to like minded peo ple in every coun try'69 When broadcasting across
North America in Apri l 1939, however, he used Buchmanite terms for ano the r pressing
purpose. Seeking to counterac t tho se calling for Canadian and American neutrality in any
Europea n war he spoke of the Christian as well as political objections to to talit arianism and of
the strength of British resolve: the British people were und ergoing not only a 'material
rearmament' but also a 'spiritu al rearmament ', preparing 'the defences of body and sou l'.?"
lie * >:<
After Bald win retired as prime minister in May 1937, his role as the National government 's
chief public moral ist passed to Halifax." Although he delivered fewer lay sermo ns than
Baldwin, Halifax's addresses received similar prominence in the press and sold well as
pamphlets, while his speeches as House of Lord s spokesman on foreign affair s from 1935 and
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as Foreign Secretary from February 1938 displayed unusual sensitivity to their moral aspects .
In August 1940 a selection of his speeches and broadcasts since 1934 was published in a
volume widely noticed as defining the Christian basis of British policy." He had been moved
by the Hatfield House meeting with the Oxford Group leaders : he 'could not doubt that the
Holy Spirit had been among our little company as we worshipped together in the family
chapel'. He remained privately sympathetic towards its members, and in July 1939 sent a
message of support for the Moral Re-Armament campaign in the United States." But he
declined requests to add his name to the Salisbury, Davidson and Brown 'Christian Front' letter
or to accept other public association with the Group . This was partly its lack of appeal to his
own sacramentalisrn, and partly ministerial and ecclesiastical caution."! But it was also
because the Group could add nothing to his already considerable authority as a spokesman of
lay Christianity. Although a 'high' Anglo-Catholic, he had - at least since the Great War -
displayed tolerance and sympathy towards other church opinions and other denominations;
and while no longer occupying active positions in the church, his manifest personal devotion,
sense of duty and solidity of 'character', and evident assumption that religion was the true basis
of social life, meant that he commanded 'the trust, respect, even veneration' of many British
Christians, and many others as wel]75
Halifax used this position to address publicly such quest ions as 'Is England Christian Still?':
it was 'vitally important [to] recapture for England & [the] world [a] sense of God's presence
in the world of men & of men's responsibility to a paramount power'. " He used it also to
justify both British values in general, and (after privately registering conscientious scruples
over the first air rearmament programme77) particular government defence and foreign
policies. Like Baldwin, Halifax believed that in the face of post-war disillusionment,
impatience, intolerance, 'false patriotism', belief in short cuts , 'quack remedies' and other
causes of totalitarianism, parliamentary democrac y was best defended not so much in term s of
its secular benefits as by affirmation of its moral and spiritual foundations . His version focused
upon a conception of personality, as under stood by reflection upon the moral order. God, it
might initially appear, had made strange arrangements for His government of the world. In
choosing to work for the good of the world through the agency of men and women and by
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endowing them with the power of choice and free will, He had taken the enormous risk that
they might misuse this free will - as indeed, they had often done, sometimes disastrously.
Insofar as God's patience and willingness to take this risk could be understood, it seemed 'to
be taken for one purpose - to achieve, through man's right direction of his free will, the
fulfilment of human personality'. It was 'against all our experience and ... understanding of the
moral order ... to expect that the way of salvation in our own difficulties' would be 'through
surrender of our private will and private judgement to some outside authority'. Halifax's
fundamental and much reiterated political message was therefore that the 'ultimate object of
government' was 'the fuller and freer development of human life so that each person may be
enabled to make the most of his or her personality'. From acceptance of this premise flowed
the other democratic political values, together with those qualities of individualism and self-
help which generated improved material standards oflife."
Yet Halifax even more than Baldwin displayed the dilemmas of a Christian politician in the
face of severe foreign policy pressures. For most of the 1930s he did not spell out the full
implications of his argument - that totalitarian government s by exalting the state as an end in
itself and by demanding the surrender of private will and conscience, inhibited their subjects
from seeking spiritual salvation and so offended against the providential order.79 He too
declared that Britain as 'the example and the champion offree institutions' had a 'special
respon sibility' for 'the future of the world'80 But moral and political example did not become
diplomatic - still less military - crusade against Germany or Italy or the Soviet Union. Like
Churchill, he declared that Britain had no 'wish to interfere with a system of government with
which we may not happen to agree' . Pro vided a government accepted the principles of
peaceful international relations , the British desire was 'to live and let live in the world' 8 I
Privately he alerted the German government to British religious and humanitarian concerns -
the German church struggle, treatment of the Jews, the fate of Austrian anti-nazis after the
Anschluss and Czech refugees after Munich - but he neither pressed the protests hard, nor
introduced these concerns into his public statements. At some level he perhaps supposed that
non-interference followed his doctrine on the moral principle of choice, which logically
required the possibility of wrong choices, and from the democratic principle of tolerance. In
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public he presented it as a policy necessity, yet with remarkable argumentative subtlety always
asserted that expediency was justified by moral principle. In unstable and delicate international
conditions 'the tendency to import into our judgements on the issues of foreign policy our likes
and dislikes of forms of government elsewhere is full of danger '. A government, like an
individual, might 'rightly be moved by indignation' at immoral or criminal acts, but even more
than an individual it had 'an imperative duty of weighing the consequences' of acting upon
mere moral revulsion. For there were both 'higher and lower calls of duty'. An attempt to
interfere, or direct ideological confrontation with the dictators, might precipitate the far
greater horro r ofwar .P Even when dictators did resort to acts of internat ional aggression, the
cause of peace might still make it desirable to accept the outcom e. In May 1938 he declared
that when 'two ideals - righteousness and peace - are in conflict, and you have to choose
between an unpractical devotion to the high purpo se that you know you cannot achieve except
by a war you do not mean to have, and the practical victory for peace that you can achieve', he
could not hesitate 'when both my conscience and my duty to my fellow men impel me directly
in the direction of peace'S)
From these perspectives Halifax presented rearmament as a means not just to secure the
'ideals and principles of the British nation' but also to maintain international peace -
paradox ical as this second argument seemed after the supposed lessons of the Great War.
Defence and peace were compatible; given that Britain's greatest interest was peace, a rearmed
Britain would make war 'far less likely'. Here was the delicate balance that the government
tried to sustain, as much in rhetoric as in policy. Against the pacifists of the left he asserted
that in the dangerous condition of the world it was neither 'politically practicable' nor 'morally
imperative' for a nation to forgo 'both the will and the right to defend what it believes to be
righr>' Against Churchill and other anti-appeasers he shared and expounded the objection of
wider peace opinion towards balance-of-power doctrine and alliances, that these would divide
Europe into armed camps and so precipitate war. 85 Against isolationists he argued that British
policy could not be merely passive avoidance of internat ional difficulties. Beginning in
ostensible support for the League of Nations, in early 1938 this became a moral presentat ion
of 'appeasement' as positive activity for peace. 'No great country has a right, even if it could,
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to throwaway its power and its capacity to exert influence on the problems that lie at its door';
it was 'our plain duty to bend all our efforts to the avoidance of catastrophe'86 Throughout,
he spoke of Christian values as the basic solution to the international crisis. The weakness of
covenants, pacts and treaties, and the suspicions, fears and misunderstandings which blocked
'the path to the temple of peace' had arisen because 'the world as a whole has not yet called
clearly enough to its aid the old cardinal qualities on which all life is based, the qualities of
Faith and Hope and Charity' . They must therefore hold firm 'to the faith that can remove
mountains; the hope that will not be denied; and the charity that seeks always to think and to
find the best, and not the worst, in other people' ."? He spoke also of the most fundamental
solution . He asked whether the world's problems were not directly due to 'the half-
heartedness and dullness' of their prayers; even the 'humblest' could pray, and this might
'achieve more than the greatest efforts of those we rank as statesmen'88
Nevertheless, from late 1938 Halifax made his criticism ofNazi Germany and later all
totalitarian regimes more explicit, and as war became more likely arguments he had earlier
offered for national rearmament changed almost seamlessly into justifications for international
resistance . Following Kristallnacht he spoke of actions 'directly oppo sed to the Christian
doctrine on which European civilization has been built'. Speaking after the German seizure of
Prague in March 1939 of the need, if people were to be asked to fight in war, for a cause
appealing to 'the highest elements in their nature' , he invoked Christian principles and moral
values."? After the outbreak of war he spoke of 'the ... denial of elementary human rights'
arousing 'something instinctive and profound in the universal conscience of mankind'. By
February 1940 the war had become a crusade to defend the 'free expression of the human
personality' against 'the Devil's work' - 'an active force of evil which, unless we fight it, will
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rapidly reduce our civilization to a desert of the soul'."? Then in July, a week after the
Churchill broadcast with which this article began, Halifax also spoke on the radio, in answer to
Hitler's public demand that Britain should submit to his will. The German people, he declared,
had 'given their consciences to Hitler' and been reduced to machines, unable to distinguish
right from wrong. Hitler had inverted all values, ordaining that force, bad faith, cruelty and
crime were right: 'that is the challenge of ami-Christ, which it is our duty as Christians to fight
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with all our power'. Speaking as he was after the Norwegian defeat, Dunkirk, and the fall of
France, with Britain alone and facing invasion, he offered comfon and hope:
Where will God lead us? Not, we may be sure, through easy or pleasant paths That is
not His way. He will not help us to avoid our difficulties. What He will do is to give
to tho se who humbly ask, the spirit that no dangers can disturb. The Christian
message to the world brings peace in war; peace where we most need it; peace of
soul. And there is one thing we can all do ... which may be more powerful than we
know. And this is to pray.
... [P]rayer is not only asking God for what we want, but rather the way to
learn to trust Him, to ask that we may know His will, and to do it with all our strength.
If we can really do our work, whatever it is, as well as we can in God's sight, it will
become His work, and we can safely leave the issue in his hands
This is the spirit in which we must march together in this crusade for
Christianity We shall go forward, seeing clearly both the splendour and the perils
of the task, but strengthened by the faith, through which by God's help ... we shall
prevail."
It has been suggested that by the 1930s a tradition of 'prophetic' statement by British
politicians had withered to Churchill's secular warnings.'? A more authoritative verdict might
be that of a great learned Anglican bishop and, it should be noted, fierce contemporary critic
of British foreign policy - Henson of Durham. Like numerou s other church leaders of all
denominations, Henson thought Baldwin's May 1937 political testament 'a magnificent
prophecy': that 'the Prime Minister of Great Britain should have delivered it in the face of the
world as it now stands is infinitely consoling'93 He similarly considered that Halifax's July
1940 broadcast gave 'noble expression to the Christian conscience':
It is not the first time in History that God elects to speak thro ugh a Layman rather than
through His ordained servants. The fumbling and calculated platitudes of Pontiffs and
Preachers count for little before the simplicity of a layman's faith ...94
* * *
So far a panicular form of Conservative public argument and rhetoric has been examined.
This was deployed to suppon rearmament and government foreign policy, and more generally
to stiffen moral and ideological resistance to the totalitarian pow ers. If the political, indeed
panisan, purpo ses are evident, this 'language' nevertheless expressed elements of personal
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belief and spiritual anguish. As such it assists understanding not just of public persuasion but
also of the dilemmas felt by leading policy-makers . Can recognition of this Christian
Conservative politics help further' Can it help explain other aspects of British politics in the
1930s and early 1940s' There are three central matters where it was important: the 1935
general election, the transformation of policy after the Munich crisis, and the sense of national
solidarity in 1939-40.
At the 1935 general election the National government defended a huge House of
Commons majority of almost 500 won in 193 I. As it eventually retained a majority of 242
seats, in retrospect it can seem that ministers and Conservative organi sers had no serious
reasons to fear defeat. From October 1933, however, by-elections had revealed slumps in the
Conservative vote - East Fulham is only the most notorious - and during the winter of 1934-35
a series of disputes and setbacks created the impression that 'every section of the population
has now been alienated from the government'. The Conservative Central Office was 'rattled'
and regarded 'no seat as safe', and Baldwin felt obliged to reassure nervous money markets
that the government was not disintegrating." This was an unusually low point, and the real
fear was less a Labour electio n victory than intervention by 'spoiling' group s which would so
greatly reduce the government majority that its claim to be 'national' would be destroyed -
weakening the coalition, its leadership , and its ability to carry its policies, including the crucial
rearmament programme. In Central Office's assessment of by-election results and general
election prospects, the 'Socialist Party' itself had made no 'substantial positive advance' but the
government had lost support due 'in large part to the widespread fear of war and a latent
suspicion that the Conservative Party is linked up with the theo ry of large armaments '. In
these circumstances, 'the Liberal vote is vital, and no political issue is likely to influence them
more than the question of peace or war and the future of the League of Nat ions'96
By 'the Liberal vote', the Central Office chiefly meant moral and religious opinion.
That concern about 'public opinion' interacted to an unusual degree with diplomacy and
defence policy in the run up to the 1935 election has become familiar."? But the extent to
which in this context the 'public' meant a religious public has been obscured, as part of a wider
assumption that after the Great War religion 'declined' and became negligible as a political
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factor. What really declined, however, was less religious belief itself than the denominational
disputes which had earlier defined party-political conflict - and what declined too was the
Liberal party, which had articulated the political culture of nonconformity. Along with other
post-war shifts, these changes contributed to complicated electoral regroup ings of religious
and moral opinion, with some nonconformists moving towards Labour but many others
reinforcing Conservative strength from 1924 or accepting the 'National' cause at the 1931
election" With another election approaching, moral issues had become more prominent and
urgent than economic and social matters, yet in ways which could now threaten Conservative
and 'National' electoral supremacy. These issues, relating to rearmament, international peace,
collective security and the League of Nations, were sensitive enough in themselves, but were
sharpened by the Abyssinian crisis and a possibility of British involvement in a Mediterranean
war. The effect was a highly uncertain and delicate state of opinion and, it seemed, a
possibility that a popular moral crusade could develop, with unpredictable and damaging
consequences for the government. Hoare, as Foreign Secretary, wro te in a diplomatic
despat ch in July 1935 that 'feeling here is becoming more and more anti-Italian and there is
every sign of the country being swept with the kind of movement that Gladstone started over
the Bulgarian atrocities'P?
One expression of this atmosphere was a public appeal by the Anglo-Catholic and pacifist
Labour party leader, Lansbury, asking the Archbishops of Canterbury and York to jo in with
the Pope in summoning a convocation of the world 's religious leaders in Jeru salem, and 'from
Mount Calvary call a truce of God and bid the war spirit rest'.IOO While Archbishop Lang was
scrupulously loyal to the government, he too contributed to the atmosphere by building upon
the interdenominational discussions on church reunion of the early 1930s to lead public
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statements and deputations to Hoare by Anglican, Free Church and Scottish church leaders in
support of peace and the League.lU I Much more significant was Cecil's League of Nations
Union. The core of the Union's membership and local organisation was a great band of church
and more especially Free Church opinion. Its corporate members included some 2,600
religious congregations, of which over 2,000 were Free Church, and its meetings had a
distinctly religious or 'revivalist' character.102 After it joined with the National Council of Free
Churches and numerous other religious. 'moral ' and voluntary groups in the so-called Peace
Ballot, the Union became a formidable movement of opinion , made more so by early
governme nt misjudgments . Criticisms of the Ballot 's wording and purpose by Conservative
offi cials, Baldwin, and Simon in November 1934 backfired. making it appear that the
government was opposed to 'the best elements in the country', and att racting support for the
Ballot from the opposition partie s.!OJ With liberal opinion and more particularly the
nonconformist conscience apparently aroused once again, and with 11.6 million people
part icipating in the Ballot by June 1935, it seemed possible that an effective 'national'
opposition to the National government might be created. Lloyd George, as the government
critic with the strongest roo ts in nonconformist politics, duly seized upon this possibility.
After failing to force his way back into Cabinet by means of his 'New Deal' economic
campaign between January and May, he tried with Gladstonian precedents in mindl04 to revive
political nonco nformity and to pre-empt and exploit the announcement of the Peace Ballot
results by forming a Council of Action for Peace and Reconstruct ion. Its manifesto, 'A Call to
Action ', published on 13 June , was signed by members of the National Free Church Council,
other leaders of the various denominations, and the editors of the main Free Church
newspapers. At the Council of Action's inaugural convention on 1-2 July, addressed among
others by Cecil, the 2,500 attendance included some 400 Free Churc h ministers.lOS
Baldwin was worried by the Peace Ballot , and especially by Lloyd George's activities . The
Peace Ballot might reinforce the electoral appeal of the Labour and Liberal oppositions, while
Lloyd George's implicit aim was to threaten a repeat of the 1929 general election stalemate,
securing the parliamentary balance of power for himself by sponsoring some 350
candidates.106 Yet at the election five months later, these movements came to very little. The
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chief explanation is that Baldwin and the Cabinet retrieved their initial misjudgment, and by a
simple yet pregnant manoeuvre both finessed the Peace Ballot movement and deflated the
Council of Action. On receiving the Ballot results on 23 JUlyl07 and over the following four
months, they expressed stro ng support for the League of Nations both in general and on the
Abyssinian issue in part icular, and justified their new rearmament programme - really intended
as a deterrence against Germany - as a means to support the League. 1O~ This had the desired
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effect: Cecil committed the League ofNations Union to support the government's international
policy. lO9 A second explanation lies in the decision to hold an early election - exploiting not
just the start of the Italo-Abyssinian war, Labour's acceptance of an armaments policy
(however qualified) and Lansbury's consequent resignation as party leader, but also, according
to Baldwin's later recollection, striking before the Council of Action had organised itself
adequately.U" A third relates to difficulties faced by Free Church members of the Council.
Since the Great War many in the Free Churches had argued that their denominations should
occupy a 'non-political' position, to avoid compromising their spiritual purposes and to reduce
internal divisions. Consequently when the Council of Action manifesto was published there
was much criticism of its signatories among the Free Churches, followed by defections from
the Council once Lloyd George's anti-government objectives became clear.' !'
There is, however, a further explanation: Baldwin's place in much liberal, religious and
more particularly Free Church opinion. Since 1924 Baldwin's speeches and addresses - with
their insistent moral character and theologically-liberal, almost non-denominational Christian
idealism - had struck deep chords in the Free Church mind. Free Church spokesmen made
much of his Methodist ancestry and invited him to address their various assemblies, at which
they routinely acclaimed him as a 'Christian gentleman' - most recently at the National Free
Church Council conference, just two months before the 'Call to Action'U? Here was a leading
element in the disarray of the Council of Action. Not only did its Free Church critics publicly
declare that Baldwin and his government deserved support; this view was shared and stated
even by signatories of the 'Call to Action'. The Rev. S.M.Berry, General Secretary of the
Congregational Union and Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council, sent Baldwin his
'sincere good wishes' on his becoming prime minister for the third time: there was 'no-one
whom we [in the Free Churches] love'and trust more than you' . Similar private or public
statements came from the Rev.S.W.Hughes, the Baptist General Secretary of the National
Free Church Council, the editors of the leading Free Church newspapers, and other
signatories . l13 The Council of Action's vice-president and most eminent Methodist of the
time, the Rev. J. Scott Lidgett, publicly contradicted Lloyd George's whole objective by
declaring that 'like great multitudes of Free Churchmen, [he had] welcomed the messages to
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the nation given by Mr.Baldwin', and the Council's purpose was to support 'the ideals
enunciated by Mr Baldwin'."!'
An understanding of Baldwin's Christian Conservative appeal not only explains how the
National government so easily absorbed the effects of the Peace Ballot and confounded the
Council of Action. There is a more general point. Plainly the votes of ordinary Free Churc h
members canno t be deduced from the statements of their spiritual leaders. Nevertheless, if
those leaders can be take n to represent the more committed moral activists, it seems probable
that much of their following was of more conservative disposition. What had once been firmly
Liberal opinion had become for many an acceptance of a Conservatism - or, as they probably
regarded it after the formation of the National government in 1931, a 'national' or even 'non-
political' cause - made morally and spiritually respectable to them principal ly by Baldwin. His
command over much of this opinion helps to explain how the government recovered and
maintained massive domestic support for its policies during 1935. Baldwin, not Lloyd
George, was, it seemed, the modern Gladstone.! '> Trust in his integrity enabled expanded and
accelerated rearmament to be successfully presented as consistent with the Peace Ballot and
the League ofNations, best symbolised in his address during the election campaign to the
Peace Society, and published verbatim in the Free Church newspapers. In giving them 'my
word that there will be no great armaments' he intended not any commitment to limit the scale
of rearmament but rather a pledge about its purpose - addressing the assumption of the
opposition parties and wider peace opinion that 'great armaments lead inevitably to war '.116
Trust in Baldwin also ensured that no 'Bulgarian atrocities' campaign developed to complicate
the Cabinet's effort s to avoid war against Italy over Abyssinia. Privately he remained
distrustful of the Free Church leader s who had in his view lent themselves to Lloyd George's
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intrigues, privately disparaging them as 'the Men of God'. When a deputation came to present
its views on the international situation in early October he spoke 'with great plainness to them
of the position of our defences', but again left them reassured about the government's
intentions. A week later the Congregational Union Assembly 'gave its earnest support' to the
government's stand 'for the collective maintenance of the Covenant'.' !" After Baldwin called
the election, The Christian World stated that the two main election issues, the League of
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Nations and rearmament, seemed at first sight 'utterly inconsistent ' - yet it considered them
reconciled in the prime minister's pledges.118 Conservative election managers became so sure
the political challenge on international issues had been neutralised that in mid campaign they
switched the emphasis more to wards dome stic issues.!'?
If the scale of the National government's election victory - and congratulatory letters from
leading Free Churchmen - was a measure of the confidence of much religious and moral
opinion in Baldwin, so too was his survival of the Hoare-Laval crisis The contrast between
the government's ostensible League idealism before the election and its apparent abandonment
of League principles shortly afterwards produced one of the great moral revulsions in British
public life, appalling many of its own supporters and even Archbishop Lang.P? Yet although
Baldwin made a humiliating retreat and plainly sacrificed Hoare in order to save his own and
the Cabinet's position, his reput ation was weakened rather than irreparably damaged . He
publicly apologi sed, took some of the blame upon himself, and justified ditching the Hoare-
Laval scheme as a response to 'the conscience and honour' of the nation.P! Free Church
leaders and newspapers said surprisingly little. Shocked as they certainly were, they did not
turn upon Baldwin. The response of one leading Free Church newpaper was probably
repre sentative : after initially refusing to believe that Baldwin would betray the nation's trust, it
later judged that as he had 'frankly confessed to an error ofjudgement', he should 'now have
the assurance of the nation' s support in carrying out its will'.122 A good man could be forgiven
if he admitted his mistake s.
A second effect of Christian Conservatism lies in the shift in Cabinet foreign policy after
Munich. Since the mid 1960s it has been well understood that this was primarily the work of
Halifax.P> but more precision can be given to the sources of his change of mind. There are
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conflicting views about the relationship between his religion and his opinions on policy. One is
that his religion detached him from the messiness ofworldly affairs, making him an innocent
towards the depravity of the dictatorships. The other view is that his religion was almost
wholly personal, and that in political matters he was almost shamelessly worldly, even
cynical.'>' It would be more accurate to describe him as a Christian realist. One of his
constant themes was 'the need for adapting ideals to facts in this hard world',125 and he was
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acutely aware that the 'facts' required confrontation with - not escape from - moral complexity.
As he wrote after the Anschluss:
we go badly wrong if we allow our judgement of practical steps to be taken to be
perpetually deflected by our moral reactions against wrong that we can in no
circumstances immediately redress. The world is a strangely mixed grill of good and
evil, and for good or ill we have got to do our best to live in it and not withdraw from
it into the desert because of the evil, like the ancient anchorites.126
Halifax's conduct of policy as well as his speeches long turned upon this need to face and
accept the 'facts', if the higher end of international peace was to be achieved. This meant not
just acceptance of the Anschluss but also British non-intervention in Spain and a proposed
recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia - justified with arguments Bishop Henson
attacked fiercely as 'cynically opportunist', only to be floored on moral points by Halifax.127
Acceptance of facts also eventually came to mean agreement to German occupation of the
Sudetenland. Yet during the Czechoslovak crisis Halifax by opposing Chamberlain in Cabinet
over the Godesberg terms took Europe to the brink of war. After the Munich agreement he
increasingly accepted war as likely. Following the German occupation of Prague in March
1939, one sensible interpretation of 'the facts' might have been that Britain could do nothing
militarily to save eastern European states, while one intelligible version of British interests
might have been that expressed by Baldwin in 1936 - allowing German aggression to turn
eastwards into conflict with Soviet Russia. Nevertheless Halifax was chiefly responsible for
the Cabinet decision to offer a military guarantee to Poland, which six months later took
Britain into war.
Halifax's shift from appeasement towards resistance has been explained by his dawning
realisation (in September 1938) that Hitler could not be trusted to prefer negotiation to armed
force, and (in March 1939) that he was not - as Halifax had originally thought - a nationalist
with an understandable desire to resist communism and re-unite the German people.P'' but had
unlimited territorial ambitions. It has been explained also as a response to domestic criticism,
from the Labour and Liberal parties and from Conservative anti-appeasers. If considered
largely as concern to avoid defeat at the next election this may be too reductionist, but
preservation of national cohesion was certainly one of Halifax's leading preoccupations. For
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him this was not just a prerequisite for successful foreign and rearmament policies. but an
elemental Conservative aim and a matter of moral and religious belief - that properly
understood, beneath the various differences ofview, the nation constituted a union of souls.'??
From this perspective it was deeply disturbing when, after explaining to a Labour deputation in
his best manner the 'moralities and expediences' of the Czechoslovak crisis, one of its members
said: 'listening to you, we are ashamed to be Britishcrs'{'?
It seems likely that there was a more fundamental reason, best indicated by Halifax's
relationship with Lord Lloyd. For a decade Lloyd had been one of his sharpest critics, at first
over India and then over foreign policy. Nevertheless they remained personal friends, and
twenty years earlier they had been political allies, linked by an Anglo-Catholic Conservatism
which they expounded in a joint book, The Great Opportunity. Here they had written that the
churches 'must act ... as sharp goad s to the conscience of the nation, and fearlessly draw
attention to matters that belie the nation's Christian profession'T" As an anti-appeaser, in
autumn 1938 Lloyd believed that the nation's church leaders had abandoned this function.
During the Munich debate in the House of Lords and in the newspapers he publicly rebuke d
the churches for preaching only peace, when 'the true message' was that Justice is greater than
peace' I32 Earlier, as the crisis was developing, Lloyd spoke with Halifax and afterwards
reinforced his arguments with a letter which ended:
War is truly terrible , but to consider it as the worst issue, to be avoided at all costs, is
utterly unchristian and wrong. There are worse issues even than war - a still worse
issue would be if we were found morally too feeble to stand up and too cowardly to
sacrifice ourselves for what is Right over what is manifestly evil and Wrong . It would
be worse than war to be unwilling to be the champions of weak peoples or that we
should, through a shrinking from suffering, fail in a task surely set by Providence . Now
is the moment to play the man, to face clearly what is coming, confident that we are
capable of drinking the cup and that we shall not be left without the power to do SO.133
\
This and further appeals to 'right' from Cecil and others prepared the way for the sleepless,
tormented, night famously inflicted on Halifax by Cadogan, his chief official, and which
resulted in his reversing his view to provide a 'fine moral lead' against the Godesberg
ultimatum. 134 These appeals had acted as 'sharp goads' to Halifax's conscience, recalling him
to principles he had expressed on 11 July 1937 in a broadcast and widely published address at
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the church which provided a focus for peace opinion, St Martin-in-the-Field. There, after
defining the Christian objection to war as the 'interruption of God's purpose - the union of all
men in Himself', he had, in the context of government rearmament, opposed Christian pacifism
with a Christian doctrine of the just war:
while war is the produ ct and symptom of evil, it is plainly not the only manifestation of
evil in the world, and it may well be that refusal to face war might have the
consequence of encouraging in worse forms the evil of which war is the visible
outcome. To Christian people, therefore ... the problem must present itselfin terms of
a comparison of evils; of which war, however deplorable in itself, may legitimately .
be felt in special circumstances not to be the greatest. 135
In contrast to Chamberlain's triumphalism, Halifax treated the Munich settlement in public and
private alike as a matter raising deep moral difficulties and touching his 'own conscience'. His
ultimate defence of the agreement was precisely in terms of his July 1937 address : not
Chamberlain's 'peace with honour', but the lesser of 'a hideous choice of evils'.136 The anti-
appeaser Cecil bitterly conceded that his House of Lords apologia was 'disgustingly good ', and
he again outclassed the professional moralist - in this case another supporter of the Munich
agreement, Archbishop Lang137 But ifin September 1938 the balance had ultimately fallen
towards acceptance of evil in central Eur ope rather than on the 'catastrophe of war', during the
crisis Halifax privately resolved that 'the ultimate end which he wished to see accomplished'
was 'the destruction of Nazi-ism'.138 From October and especially after the Kristallnacht
pogrom in November.P" his stance in Cabinet on policy towards Germany and on rearmament
became markedly tougher. When Hitler broke the Munich agreement in March 1939, Halifax
was insistent that the balance between evils had now shifted. Arguing in Cabinet Committee
for the Polish guarantee - even while admitting that Britain had no military means of fulfilling
it - he stated that 'if we had to choose between two great evils he favoured our going to
\
war'.':" And this view, drawn from his conception of the Christian doctrine of the just war,
became a leading theme of his speeches: 'if, for fear of the tragedy ofwar ... we rest inert
before action which we hold evil, we are surely surrendering to annihilation the ... spiritual
values which have inspired and guided all human progress'. ':" After the outbreak of war
Halifax gave his imprimatur as Foreign Secretary to a pamphlet by Lord Lloyd, endorsing his
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argument that the war was fundamentally being fought to defend those Christian ideals which
taught that 'man redeemed by Christ could never again be enslaved to man and that he must. to
fulfil the purpose which he had now learnt to be the very core of his being, be a free moral
agent'.1-12
This leads to the third, more speculative, suggestion, about the national solidarity achieved
in 1939 and 1940. In September 1938 much British opinion - especially that of the churches -
was strongly for peace; yet twelve months later there was negligible opposition to the
outbreak of war, and remarkably few Christian pacifist conscientious objectors. It may be that
this transformation was primarily caused by the further action s of the German government:
Kristallnacht, the occupation of Prague and the invasion of Poland. Yet those actions were
interpreted to the British public, above all by political leaders : they presented the most
influential justifications for a stiffening of resistance to Germany and for the sacrifices that war
would necessarily bring, and they were the most prominent in seeking to create the national
spirit and co-operation which total war and civilian fortitude under aerial attack would require .
This was true of Conservative ministers and ex-ministers as well as Labou r, Liberal and
Conservative 'anti-appeasers'. After Kristallnacht Inskip and Zetland publicly expressed their
dismay and implied that it shook the hopes invested in the Munich sett lement, while Baldwin
with unpu blicised government support headed a fund-raising appeal organised by all British
religious communities to aid Jewish and non-Aryan refugees, launched with a broadcast
invoking a challenge to 'Christian charity'.14) Halifax's sharpened anti-totalitarian rhetoric
from late 1938, as well as his pressure for the shift in policy symbolised by the Polish
guarantee in March 1939, were crucial in shaping the shift towards national acceptance of war.
There was also a momentous convergence of rhetorics among leading Conservatives. Baldwin
\
and Halifax now adopted the balance-of-power 'doctrine' they had earlier eschewed, presenting
it as the histo ric tradition, even Providential purpose, of British policy - 'the fight against Philip
of Spain, Louis XIV, and Napoleon, leading up to the fight against tyranny to-day'lv' - while
Churchill, as has been seen, increasingly introd uced allusions to Christianity and moral values.
Nevertheless, during 1939 Churchill's speeches still lacked the spiritual appeal of Halifax's.
For all the obvious exaggeration, there was some substance in Archbishop Lang's comment on
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a Halifax speech of July 1939: it had 'united the whole nation. Its reception had been a tribute
to the confidence of all parties in his spirit, his motives, his calmness, his steadiness of
judgement'.1" 5
The significance of what Halifax represented is indicated by the way his reputation, in
contrast to Chamberlain's, not only survived the decline of their shared policy of appeasement
but increased and remained strong during the first nine months of war. He replaced Eden as
the Conservative with the widest public appeal, and in May 1940 was the preferred candidate
of most leading politicians of all parties - including Labour - to replace Chamberlain as prime
minister .!" This plainly had much to do with his tougher stance in Cabinet, seepage of
information about his differences with Chamberlain into wider political circles, and knowledge
of his longstanding desire for a reconstructed, all party, government of national unity. But
there were also further, public, contrasts. When Eden had resigned as foreign secretary in
February 1938 he seemed weIl placed to exploit a personal cross-party appeal and become in
time the 'national' successor to Chamberlain, a position Baldwin encouraged him to confirm by
a series of speeches reaching weIl beyond his foreign policy specialism.1"7 Eden made the
speeches, yet graduaIly faded. Aside from his awkward efforts to balance between criticism
and support of the government, his version of Conservative international idealism was both
less dramat ic than Church ill's and relentlessly secular - so doubly failing to catch a growing
public mood . Chamberlain's difficulties in preserving his policies and eventuaIly his leadership
were closely connected to the way in which, for all his efforts in international conciliation, in
domestic politics he aggravated conflict with his Liberal and Labour critics, to the extent that
when he finaIly and reluctantly accepted suggestions for a government of 'national unity', the
Labour condition was his own removal. This was a product not only of political manner, but
\
of argumentative substance and tone . Chamberlain did not sufficiently distinguish his desire
for international peace from his statements about the character of the Italian and German
governments , and he could not express his undoubted political and moral distaste for these
regimes in forms adequate to repel damaging suspicions and insinuations. This reflected an
insensitivity or deafness towards a now highly-sensitised and vocal range of opinion reaching
across party boundaries. Chamberlain was a lapsed Unitarian, a spiritual status which in a
prime minister 'grieved' Archbishop Lang, even tho ugh Chamberlain described himself as a
'reverent agnostic' - the sort , evidently, who did not attend church even for form's sake, but
liked his wife to do so. 1 4~ That most church leaders gave unqualified praise to a politician
who was so obvious ly not a Christian, as they did during the Munich crisis, is not just ironic.
Such admiration indicated their distance from much lay political opinion which, though greatly
relieved that war had been avo ided, was also much exercised by the moral predicament and so
came to be more impressed by Halifax than by Chamberlain (and may indeed have regarded
Halifax as a surer moral guide than Lang). During the Munich debate Chamberlain
acknowledged the charged atmosphere to the extent of saying that the 'prayers of millions
have been answered', but when he went on to speak of a 'spiritual revival' he meant only the
call to national service. Ifhe half-apologised for and qualified 'peace for our time' - as was
only necessary if continued rearmament was to be justified - his still more egregious 'peace
with honour' remained.!" But the damage had begun before Munich. Halifax's earliest
hesitations about appeasement dated from the difficulty he perceived in May 1938 over
domestic presentation of the proposed agreement with Italy, in the context of what he found
to be Labour 'hatred' for Chamberlain.P? In the House of Commons debate on the agreement
Chamberlain shocked and infuriated Labour leaders by a eulogy of the 'new Italy' and
favourable comparison of Mussolini with Cavour, Mazzini and Garibaldi. As Chamberlain
himself noted, the purport of Labour criticism was not just that he was 'a Fascist ' and 'enemy
of the League', but also that he was 'a materialist'.I; ! His policy was publicly criticised as
'immoral'. Even in private TUC leaders asked whether Chamberlain intended a military
alliance 'with fascists'. After Munich Attlee stated that Labour was 'convinced that [he]
truc kles to the dictators because he likes their principles'152 In trying to support Chamberlain
,
by counteracting such accusations, Halifax eventually found himself widely regarded as his
obvious replacement.
* * *
British politics and policy in the 1930s were not treated by all those chietly concerned as
wholly secular matters . Conservative high politics contained strands of Christian faith and
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witness which shaped reactions to the totalitarian powers, had some effect upon policy, and
helped recruit support for government objectives. A vast amount has been asserted about
Churchill's opposition to Germany in the 1930s, and about his rallying the nation from May
1940. Even now there are historians who assume that Churchill stood prett y much alone
among leading politicians in detecting the evils of nazism - a prophet in the wilderness, far
removed from complacent, naive, or otherwise culpable Cabinet ministers. It is an enduring
tradit ion of British belief Yet much of what Churchill had to say about the nature of the
fascist powers - certainly in 1940 - was very similar to what had been said by Baldwin since
1933 and Halifax since 1937. Indeed, Baldwin and Halifax presented a moral and ideological
resistance to totalitarianism and especially to Germany which was every bit as impressive as
Churchill's, and which in its Christian aspects had wider and deeper resonances. Churchill
himself came to recognise the importance of these aspect s, not only in his own speeches but
also by bringing the anti-appeasing Bishop Henson out of retirement to preach at Westminster
and by warm approval of Halifax's July 1940 broadcast: 'he became very eloquent about his
firm conviction of the necessity ofultimate sanctions, and explained how convinced he was
that it had been the loss of this conviction that had done England great harm'.153 At the very
least, Baldwin's influence over much 'moral opinion' in the mid- 1930s eased the acceptance of
rearmament, while Halifax's eased the acceptance of a second world war.
There is no country ... where there are not somewhere lovers of freedom who look to
this country to carry the torch and keep it burning bright until such time as they may
again be able to light their extinguished torches at our flame. We owe it not only to
our own people but to the world to preserve our soul for that.
This might have been Churchill in 1940, but it was not. It was Baldwin speaking in 1934.154
University ofDurham PHILIP WILLIAMSON
34
* I am grateful to members of the Oxford modern British religions history seminar and the Durham history
seminar for helpful comments. and to two referees forbringing further material 10 my a ttention.
1 W.5.Churchill. Into Battle (London. 1 9~ I) [speeches May 193~-NoY.1 9~lIJ . pp.2~~-9 .
2 Churchill. /ll/a Battle, p.511 (5 Oct. 193~) .
3 Sec W.S. Churchill. Arms and rhe Covenant (London. 1 93~) . a selection of speeches [rom 1932 to March
193X.
~ Churchill. Into Battle. p.17 (9 May 1 93 ~ ) . Sec also W.5.C hurchill. Complete Speeches 1897- 1963. ~ "015.
ed, R. Rhodes James (New York. 1 97~ ) . , i.5627 (31 May 1935). 578X-90 (24 Sept.l936). 5907 (21
Dec.1936). and Into Battle. pp. 5~-6 (16 OCt.l93X). lOll (20 April 1939).
5 Churchill. Collected Spe eches. vi, 5 73 ~ (23 April 1936).5853 (14 April 1937): Into Batt le . pp.13 (9 May
193X). 3X-9 (27 Aug.193X). I H (28 Jnne 1939). 135 (I Oct.1939).
6 Churchill. Collected Speeches. yi.57~9-90 (2~ Sept.1936). 5803 (5 Nov.1936). 5910 (21 Dec.1937). 5926-7
(14 March 193X): Into Battle . pp.17-18 (9 May 193X). 58-9 (16 Oct. 193X). 108- 10 (19 May 1939).
128a·b (3 Sept. 1939).
7 M. Cowling. Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England. i (Cambridge. 1980). pp. 285. 2~9-90. 295·
6.312: P. Addison. 'Destiny. history and providence: the religion of Winston Churchill'. in M.Bemley
(ed.). Public and Private Doctrine (Cambridge. 1993). pp. 240. H 2-3: and see the famous passage in
W.5.C hurchill. The Second World War i . The Gathering Storm (1948). p.60 l. For his ignorance
ahem the Church. J.G. Lockha rt. Cosmo Gordon Long (London. 1949). pp.~29. 435.
8 In addition to the I~ Julv broadcast. see Churchill. Into Bottle. pp.181 ('we trust in God'. 30 Marc h). 2118
('a ll the strength that God can give us'. 13 May). 212 ('as the Will of God is in Heaven. so let it be').
19 May). 223 ('in God's good time'. \~ June). 234 (upon the Battle of Britain 'depends the survival of
Christian civilisation', 18 June). 274 ('let God defend the Right'. II Sept.).
9 R.McKibbin. Classe s and Cultures. England 1918-1951 (Oxford. 1998). p.290. and sec pp.272-8. 2X9. 294.
10 The Times. 15-17. 19.29-30 Sept.. l. 3 Oct. 1938: A. Wilkinso n. Dissent or Conform? War, Peace and the
English Churches 1900-/N5 (London. 19X6). pp. 1 7~-8 : A.Chandler. 'Munich and morality. The
Bishops of the Church of England and appeasement'. Twentieth Century British History, 5 ( 1994).
35
pp.80-1. An unofficial Anglican and Free Church 'League of Prayer and Service'. formed in the
aftermath of Munich. claimed five-and-a-half mill ion members by September 1939: The Times. I
Nov.1938: Wilkinson. Dissent ofConfonn? p.176.
II Details in The Times for the appropriate periods. The churches also organ ised additional. less official. davs
of prayer for peace at Whitsuntide 1939 and 1940. for thanksgiving after Dunkirk (9 June) and for the
safety of France (16 June 1940). Archbishop Lang found in early 1940 that the government declined
to support further official Days of National Prayer. as likely to be 'misunderstood. or misrepresented.
by the enemy' (presumably as an indication of weakness or desperation). so he instead resorted to the
formula of acting with 'the express desire of the King': The Times. 2 April. 22 May 1940: Lockhart.
Lang, pA27 . In The Times. 2 July 1940. Lang and Archbishop Temple. again with the King's express
approval. publicly proposed that every day should be observed (at noon) as a day of national prayer.
12 KRobbins, History, Religion and Identity in Modern Britain (London. 1993). ch. l -l, 'Britain . 1 9~O. and
"Christian Civilization'"; G.White. 'The Fall of France'. Studies in Church History. 10 (1983).
ppA32-7.
13 A.Hastings. A History 0/English Christianity 1920-1985 (London. 1986). chs.20-23. 26-27: Wilkinson.
Dissent or ConfonnZ ; Robbins. History, Religion and Identity . ch. I l . 'Free Churchmen and the
twenty years crisis' : M.CeadeL Pacifism in Britain (Oxford. 1980): Chandler. 'Munich and
morality'. pp.79-89.
I ~ Sec. however. M.Cowling. The Impact ofHitler. British Politics and British Policy 1933-19-10
(Cambridge. 1915). TIlls remains the most sophisticated and comprehensive analysis so far of
political responses to the totalitarian threats. It has been the unconscious or under-acknowl edged
source for 'revisionist' biograph ies and monographs since the mid-1980s.
15 R.McKibbin . The Ideologies ofClass. Social Relations in Brttain 1880- 1950 (Oxford. 1990). ch.9:
D. Jarvis . 'The Conservative party and the politics of gender 1900-1939'. in M.Francis and
LZweiniger-Bargielowska. The Conservatives and British Society 1880-1990 (Cardiff. 1996).
16 Suggestive contributions are B.Schwarz. 'The language of constitutionalism. Baldwinite Conservatism'. in
Formations ofNation and People (London. 198~). pp.I-18. and P.CatteralL 'The party and religion '.
in A.Seldon and S.Bali (eds.), The Conservative Century (Oxford. 199~). esp. pp.645-53.
36
17 Cartland, Cranborne and Wohner are thus described in Cowling. Impact ofHiller, pp. 2-19-50.
18 The Cabinet also included a Jew. Hore-Belisha. if one with 'non-sectarian' religious interests which
included Roman Catholicism. During the Czechoslovak crisis he wrote privately of Britain as the
trustee ofa civilisation which presumed 'decent treatment of human beingstowards one another':
R.J.Minney. The Private Papers ofHore-Bettsho (london. 1960). pp.Sx, 303--1. 1-16. Nevertheless
he does not appear to have expressed any explicitly Jewish concern about events in Germany.
19 R.F.V. Heuston. Lives ofthe Lord Chancellors 1885-19-10 (Oxford. 196-1). pp .58-1-5: National Church
league advertisements in Crockford's Clerical Directory 1933--17: speech to the Imperial Alliance for
the Defence of Sunday. The Times. 2 Dec. 1936.
20 lACross. Sir Samuel Hoare (l ondon. 1977). pp. I. 19. 13. 30-1. indicates a little of this : further details are
in Templewood papers II3 . II8-9. Cambridge University library.
21 For Zetland (formerly lord Ronaldshay) as author. president of the Society for Promoting the Study of
Religions. and host of the World Congress of Faiths. see G. Studdert-Kcnnedy. British Christians,
Indian Nationalists and the Raj (Delhi. 1991), pp.luz, 172-3. 167. 2-l-ln.7 -1 .
22 l ay churchmanship is a neglected aspect of numerous polit icians' careers. Past lay members of the
Church of England's Convocations or from 1919 the Church Assembly included. among other active
politicians. Ormsby-Gore (to 1919) and Hoare (to 1925). while Salisbury. Inskip (since 1917). and
Walmer (since 1919) were current members: details in Crockf ords Clerical Directory. For
Cecils and their relatives effectively controlling the House of laity. see Hastings. English Christianity,
pp. 63--1. 252-3. lord Cecil was chairman of the Archbishops' Commission on Church and State
1930-35. which received evidence from Walmer and Inskip.
23 Cowling. Impact ofHitler. pp.377-8 : KRosc. The Later Cecils (l ondon. 1975). p.159.
2-1 B.Cartlanci Ronald Cartland (l ondon. 19-12). pp.61-2. 119-20. 127. 135-6 . 139--10: Chamberlain to Ida
Chamberlain. 5 Ang . 1939. N[eville1C[hamberlain papers) 18!!!!11!. Birmingham University
Library.
25 Cowling. Impact ofHitter. p. 317.
26 Ormsby-Gore to Baldwin. 2-1 May 1935. Baldwin papers -17/56. Cambridge University Library.
37
27 The Times. 6 Sept. 1938. The approach of the congress had aroused 'considerable feeling' among
Conservative !vIPsfrom late 1937. with repeated calls for it to be banned or its foreign delegates
denied entry into Britain: Ho use ofCommons Debates 5th s. [HCDebj 328. c.1836-7: 329. cc. 223 3 -~ :
33 1. cC.369-71: 3 3~. ccA98-9: 337. cc.125 1-3. Hoare as Home Secretary felt that given British
conventions of religious toleration he could. or should. do nothing. The manifesto. sent to leaders of
all churches. became the alternative means of expressing this disquiet.
28 Sir Samuel Hoare. The Balanced Life (London. 1938). pp.38-9.
29 Lord Eustace Percy et.al.. Conservatism and the Future (London. 1935). pp. 20-~ . See also Percy. 'Can
Democracy Survive?'. in Mary Adams (ed.). The Modern State (London. 1933). pp. 1~7. 162. for
Christianity as thechief antidote to communism.
30 A London Journalist [Newman Walts]. with a preface by Sir Thomas Inskip P.C.. e.B.E.. K.e.. Britain
without God. A n exposure ofanti-GodisIII (London, 1935). Watts was a prolific author of such
popular tracts, ineluding Whv Sunday ? and Why go to Church ? For church leaders. see Hastings .
English Christianity . p.312.
3 l Cecil to Halifax. 6 July 1938. Fa 800/328/113-5. Public Record Office: Cowling, Impact a/Hitler. p.229.
but see pp.377-8 for other Cccils being divided over Soviet Russia's possible contr ibution to the
diplomatic problems.
32 Listed among pro-Franco organisations in N.J. Crowson, Facing Fascism. The Conservative Party and
the European Dic tators 1935--10 (London. 1997). p.79. This beak primarily examines internal party
dynamics rather than ideological issues. as its title might suggest.
33 T.Jones. Diarv with Letters (London. 195~). pp.2l5-6 (2 June 1936); Inskip memo. 11 March 1938, Fa
8001313/25-8. For British church leaders' incffectualitv on the German church issue. see Robbins.
History. Religion and Ldentitv. ch. Iz .
3~ Wilkinson. Dissent or Conform", ch-l. pp.139--10. 165. 170-81: Hastings . English Christianity. pp.3~8-9 .
35 Churchi ll. Into Battle . p.17 (9 May 1938),
36 See. however. Winterton , 'The Churches and Politics' . 77,e Nineteenth Century and After, cxix (1936), and
Duff Cooper, Old .\ len Forget (195~), pp.197-9 . for some replies to clerical pacifism.
38
37 P.Williamson. 'The Doctrina l Politics of Stanley Baldwin' . in M.Bentiev (ed.). Public and Private
. .
Doctrine (Cambridge. 1993). pp. 181-208. A common description of Baldwin as 'High Church '
is mistaken: for his religion. see P'Williamson. Stanley Baldwin . Conserv ati ve leadership and
national values (Cambridge. 1999). pp. 1 0~-8. 277-83.
38 Jones. Diarv with Letters. p.115 (Baldwin letter. I~ Sept. 1933). For fuller analysis of Baldwin's anti-
totalitarianism. see Williamson . Baldwin , pp.313-26. 329-35.
39 At Ashr idge, The Times. 3 Dec.193~ (references to newspaper reports of Baldwin 's speeches are to the
press cuttings in the Baldwin papers. vols, 20 1 -~). It should be acknowledged that Baldwin used
speech-writers: but if the wordshe spoke were not always his own, the meanings were. This issue
is considered in Williamson. Baldwin. pp.157-66.
~O At Edinburgh. Glasgow Herald. 19 NO\·. 1933.
~1 Jones. Diarv with Letters, pp.123-~ (27 Feb. 193~ ) .
~2 Baldwin addressing Conservative defence deputation . 29 July 1936. in M.Gilbert (cd.), If:S.C"hurchill V.
Companion Part 3 (London. 1982). p.289.
~3 HCDeb 302. c.371 (22 Mav 1935): at Conservative conference. The Times. 5 Oct. 1935.
H .Yew York Times. 17 Aug.1939.
~5 At Ashridge. The Times. 3 Dec.1 93~ : at National Free Church Council conference. ibid.. 9 April 1935.
~6 The Times. ~ May 1935, 2 May 1936.
H S.Baldwin. Service of 011I' Lives (London. 1937). pp.166-7. The speech was drafted by Jones. but these
words were 'earnestly' approved by Baldwin: Jones unpubl ished 'diary'. 18. 20 May 1937. Thomas
Jones papers. National Library of Wales (this compilation includes many letters, but the term 'diary' is
used here for ease of reference).
~8 To Conservative defence deputation. 29 July 1936. in Gilbert . Churchill V/3. p.291.
~9 HCDeh 302. cC.372-3 (22 May 1935)
50 Baldwin. Service, p. 162: S.Baldwin. On England (London. 1926). p. 196: SBaldwin. This Torch 0/
Freedom (London. 1935). p.375.
51 E.g. Baldwin. On England. pp. 106. 229-30: !/CDeh 270. c.638 (10 Nov.1932): to Primrose League and at
Wishaw. The Times. ~ May 1935. 22 June 1936.
39
52 House ofLords Debates 5th s. [HLDebJ, I 10. c.1 39~ (~ Oct. 1938): Lang broadcast. The Times, 29 Sept.
1938.
53 The Earl of Halifax. Fulness ofDays (London. 1957). p.225 (Baldwin letter. 23 July 1 9~O ). See also
Baldwin to Halifax. 25 Dec.1938. Halifax papers A~AIO.I~.lO Borthwick Institute . University of
York AW.Baldwin. Xly Father. The True Storr (London. 1955). p.328 (letter 1938): TCazalet-Keir.
From the Wings (London. 1967). p. I06 .
5~ To Primrose League. 1/lC Times. ~ May 1935: and see Baldwin . Service. p.15 I (12 May 1937).
55 At Asbridge, The Times. 3 Dec . I93~ : Baldwin . Torch, pp.5-6. 23: Baldwin . Service. p.120.
56 Congressional Record. June 1939. copy in J.C.C.Davidson papers 263. House of Lords Record Office. For
some indication of the range of sympathisers. see D'Bebbington. 'Tlie Oxford Group movement
between the wars' . Studies in Church Historv 23 (1986) , ~95-507. and G.Lean , Frank Buchman
(London. 1985). chs , 22 -~ .
57 Salisbury account of the meeting. IO- II Oct. 1936. in Archbishop Lang papers 1~5/2~8-5~. Lambeth
Palace Library. See also Rose . Later Cecils. pp.95-99: Lean . Buchman. pp.2~9-50.
58 Salisbury speech at Birmingham. and Brown at Wolverhampton. The Times. 30 March. 28 Julv 1937.
59 Salisbury to Baldwin. 19 Oct. 1936 (bearing annotation of Baldwin's reply. 22 Oct.) . Baldwin papers
171/272; Lean. Buchman . pp.25~-5 . Baldwin's wife had attended Group luncheons. while his cousin
Margaret Mackail and her husband Professor 1.W.Mackail were enthusiastic supporters of the Group.
60 Ibid.. p.255: Buchman to Davidson. 29 April 1937. Davidson papers 229. Davidson's papers contain
several requests from Group members that he might seek Baldwin's support.. The 1938 letter in
Baldwin . j~v Father, p.327-8. was addressed to an 'insistent' Group supporter. probably Mrs Mackail.
6 I Salisbury notes of Hatfield meeting. 10-1I Oct. 1936. and Archbishop Lang to Salisbury. 2~. 28 July
1937. Lang papers 1~5/2~8-5~. 153{3 ~2-3 . 3~6 : Lean. Buchman. pp.252 -3: Bebbington. 'Oxford
Group' . pp.502-5 .
62 Lean. Buchman. p. 255: Jones. Diary With Letters . p.233 (3 1 July 1936): Rose . Later Cecils. p.100:
Davidson-Baldwin letters. 2. 20 Aug. 19~ I. Davidson papers 283. for a 'certain distrust of Group
methods'.
40
63 Salisbu ry to Sankey. 15 July 1936. Sankey papers. Bodleian Library. Mss Eng. Hist. c.515/-I-5: Salisbury
notes on Bournemoutli house-party. 8-9 Jan. 1936. and Hatfield con ference. JII-I I Oct. 1936. Lang
papers. 1-15/206- 17. 2-18-5 -1 .
6-1 Lean . Buchman . chs. 19, 2 1 (quotation p.2-10). for an apol ogetic account. and pp.25 1-2 for Salisbury and
comments made at Hatfi eld. For a more critical perspective. Bebbington. 'Oxford Group'. pp.505-6.
65 Salisbury. Mackall. Brown and Davidson letter. 'The Christian Front' . The Times. 7 Aug. 1937 . The
Group's activities in othercountries are outlined in Lean. Buchman. ells.20. 22--k
66 The letter. published on I Sept. 1938, carried different numbers of signatories in various national and
regional newspapers: The Scotsman gives 33. t he Times 27. Forlater letters see ibid. 24 Oct. (trade
union leaders and Labour MPs). 29 Oct.. 2 Nov. (sportsmen). II Nov. 1938 (including Lords Athlone.
Fitzalan. Rennell and Howard of Penrith). Throughout the autumn The Times contained further
letters on similar lines from other sources. frequently alludingto the 'moral re-armament' statements.
Further products of this deba te included T.S.Eliot. The Idea ofo Christian Society (London. 1939) :
see pp.85- 7. also 63--1.
67 Salisbury to Baldwin, -I Aug . 1938. Baldwin papers 17-1/79.
68 The Times. 10 Sept. 1938: the other signatories were Lords Kennel. Clarendon. Lytton. and Desborough
(Conservative). Amulree and Sankey (National Labour ). Stanmore (Liberal) and Stamp, and Field
Marshals Lord Birdwood and Milne. RAF Marshal Lord Trenchard. Admira l Lord Cork and Orrery.
and the academics Mackail, \V.Bra gg and \V.D.Ross. For the wide publicity given to this letter. see
Lean . Buchman, p.275 .
69 lbid.: Baldwin to Lady Davidson. 9 Sept. 1938. Lady Davidson papers (quoted by permission of Mr R.
OldJicld and Lord Baldwin) .
70 S.Baldwin, An Interpreter ofEngland (London. 1939). p.106: lectures delivered at the University of
Toronto, but also broadcast acro ss Canada and the U.S.A. For his intentions, Baldwin to Dawson.
8 April 1939, Bodleian Library. Dawson papers 80/155.
71 Baldwin to Halifax. 16 Aug. 1937, Halifax papers A-I.-IIO.I -l.6. exp ressing admiration for two such Halifax
addresses. is indicative.
41
72 Speeches on Foreign Policv bv I ' SCOUIlt Halifax. ed. HH.E. Craster (Oxford. I9~0) . As with Baldwin
there is an issue of precise authorship. Tlie Diaries o,/S/I' Alexander Cadogan /938-19-15. ed. D.Dilks
(London. 1971), pp. 89. 112. 121. 175. 3 10. 322. has indications of officials as speech writers. and on
occasion Lionel Curtis and perhaps others helped. But his most 'spiritual' speeches and passages
certainly seem to have been his own. and he took great care over even his Foreign Office drafts: see
e.g. ibid.. p.185.
73 Halifax. Fulness 0./Days. pp.155-6: Charles to Halifax. 13 Nov .1937. Halifax papers A~AIO.3 .2(xi i):
Bards ley to Halifax. 26 May 1938. FO 800/3 28110~-9 : Lean. Buchman . p.253.
7~ Salisbury to Rev. A.Don. 29 July 1937. Lang papers 1 53 /3~ 7: Davidson to Halifax. ~ Aug.1937. Davidson
papers 233: Halifax. Fulness ofDays. p.155.
75 Wilkinson. Dissent or Con/arm? p.187. As Edward Wood he had been active (with Hoare and the Cecils)
in the parliamenta ry' Church Defence Committee before 1920. and a member of the Archbishops'
Committee on Church and State 191 3-1~ and of the House of Laymen/Laity until his appointment as
Viceroy oflndia in 1925. In 1933 he presided over a session of the Anglo-Catholic Congress and he
remained the leading lay figure in the English Church Union. but held no formal post. For
contemporary estimates of this aspect of his reputation, see e.g. 'Gentleman with a Duster' [H.Begbie).
The Conservative Mind (London. 192~). ppA7-59: 'Watchman' [V'Adams], Right Honourable
Gentlemen (London. 1 9~0 ) . pp. 306-23.
76 Notes for speech to the Church Union. II July 1935. Halifax papers A~AIO . 1.~9 .
77 Halifax to Baldwin. 19 July 193~. Baldwin papers 11108. sent 'for the sake of my own conscience' to ask
that the announcement should stress the Cabinet's continued hope for disarmament
78 Halif ax Speeches. pp.S-11 (The world and democracy'. 27 Sept. 193 ~). and see pp. 83 (25 June 1937). SS-
90. 96 (Democracy', S July 1937). 142 (29 March 1935). 176 ('The purpose of British policy'. 21 June
1938). 216-7 (3 Feb.1939). 227 (Democracy and foreign policy'. 13 March 1939). 363 -~ (The
challenge to liberty'. 27 Feb. 19~0) .
79 See ibid.. pp.9. 96. for careful formulations.
80 Ibid.. pp.97. 11. and see pp.86. 1 ~3 . 225. 228.
42
81 Ibid.. pp. 179 (21 June 1938). and see pp. 207. 262-~ (the latter. 19 April 1939. embraced Soviet Russia. in
the context of the proposed rapprochment with Moscow).
82 Ibid.. pp.9~ (8 July 1937). 221-2 (3 Feb.1939). 229-30 (13 March 1939): speech to Roval lnstitute of
International Affairs. 71,e Thnes. 2 Dec. 1936.
83 Halifax Speeches. p. 160. also pp. 15~-5 (on proposed recognition of the Italian conquest of Abyssinia). and
sec pp.221-2. 229-30.
8~ At York. The Times, 28 July 193~: Halif ax Speeches, pp.38-9. also pp. 13-1~ . ~2 . 7~. 78. and see below
pp.OOO for his major address dealing with pacifism.
85 A persistent theme: ibid.. pp .3~. 37. <7. 79. 115. 1~3 . 179. 205-6.
86 Ibid.. pp.75 (3 March 1937). 17~-5 (21 June 1938). and see pp. l-l.t, 165-6.
87 Ibid.. pp.38-9 (23 March 1936: substantially repeated at Edinburgh. 71,e Times. 27 Nov.1936). and see
-r
pp.51 (8 April 1936). 109-10 (21 Oct.1937). 227-8 (13 March 1939)
88 Ibid.. pp. 103-~ (11 July 1937)
89 Ibid.. pp.221 (3 Feb.1939). 268-9 (19 April).
90 Ibid.. pp.331 (broadcast on 'The purpose of the struggle'. 7 Nov. 1939). 363. 367 ('The challenge to liberty'.
27 Feb. 1940). and see pp. 3~2. 351-2.
9 1 The Times. 23 July 19~0 . and see Lockhart. Lang . p.43!.
92 Robbins. History, Relig ion and ldentitv. p.IIO-16 (essay 'On Prophecy and Politics').
93 Henson journal. 19 May 1937. Dean and Chapter Library. Durham Cathedral (emphasis in original) . For
Ius criticisms. see O.Chadwick. Hensley Henson (Oxford. 1983). pp,241-73.
9~ Henson to Canon Whiting. 28 July 1 9~0. in E.F.Braley (ed.), Letters ofHerbert Hensley Henson
(London. 1951). p.122. cf. H.H.Henson. Retrospect ofan Unimportant Lif e iii (London. 1950). pp.8~.
129 (journal, 28 Feb.. 23 July 1 9~O}.
95 R.A.Butler to Lord Brabourne, 22 Feb. 1935. Brabourne papers F97/20A. British Library India Office
Collections: Re al Old TOI:v Polit ics. 711e Political Diaries ofRobert Sanders, Lord Bavjiml 19[0-
1935 ed. J.Ramsden (London. 198~ ) . p.251 (21 April. but referring to Feb.1935): Simon diary. 1~
Fcb.1935. John Simon papers. Bodleian Library: Baldwin at Chelsea. The Times. 22 Feb.1935.
43
Y6 Gower to Baldwin. l Ang. 1935. and see Topping to Lloyd. 8 April 1935. Baldwin papers ~7/1 03-8 .
51/157 -8: Brooke memos. 1933-35. CRD 1/7/16. Bodleian Library. Conservative party arch ives.
Historica l assessments of the by-election performance and its effects arc C.T.Stannage. 'The East
Fulham by-election'. Historical Jo urnal 1 ~ (1971). 165-200. and J.Ramsden. '1931 to 1939' and
M.Ceadel. 'Interpreting East Fulham'. in C.Cook and lRamsden (eds.). Bv-Elections 111 British
Poli tics (London. 1973). pp.l09-15.118-39.
97 Sec esp. RA.C.Parker. 'Great Britain. France and the Ethiopian Crisis 1935-36'. English Historica l Re view
89 (197~) . 293-332: Cowling. Impact oJHil/er. ch.J .
98 Williamson. 'Doctrinal Politics' . pp.205-7: McKibbin . Classes and Cultures. pp. 96-7. 283. 295: M.
Goodman. 'A Faded Heritage. English Baptist politica l thinking in the 1930s'. Baptist Quarterly
(1997) . pp.58-61. Cf. J.Ramsden. 11,e .·lge oJ Balfour and Baldwin (London. 1978). p.126: for the
Conservative party after 1918 'the decline of religion was a serious blow'.
99 Hoare to Drummond 27 July 1935. Fa 800/295/78 .
100 The Times. 19 Ang. 1935. His appeal contr ibuted to the Rev. H.R.L.Sheppard's formation of the pacifist
Peace Pledge Union: Ceadel. Pacif ism in Britain. pp.189-90.
101 E.g . The Times. 28 Aug.. 12 Oct.. 23 Oct. 1935. For Lang going to remarkable lengths to avoid Church
stateme nts which might embarrass the government. see Halifax -Don exchange 25. 29 July 1935 and
Lang to Baldwin. 3 Aug.1935. Baldwin papers 170/170-2. 125-7.
102 D.Birn. The Leag ue ofXo tions Lnion 1918-19-15 (Oxford. 1981). pp.3 -~. 136-8: D.Waley. British Public
Opinion and the Abyssinian iiar 1935-36 (London. 1975). p.93: Lord Templewood, V ine Troubled
Years (London. 195~ ) . p. 113.
103 lA.Thompson. 'The "Peace Ballot" and the "Rainbow" Controversy'. Jo urnal ojBritish Studies 20 (198 1).
166-7: M.Ceadel. 'The first British referendum: the Peace Ballot 193 ~-5 ' . English Historical Review
95 (1980) . 810-39 . esp.823 -9.
1O~ W.P.Crozier. Offthe Record. Polttical Interviews 1933-19-13. ed. A.lP.Taylor (London. 1973). p.~9
( 19 July 1935). 111e Christian World. 22 Aug.1935. drew a parallel with the Midlothian campaign.
Later. Cecil's position was also compared to that of Gladsto ne: Noel Baker in 1 9~5 . quoted in Birn.
League ofvatiuns L'nion, pp.3-..J..
44
105 S.Koss. 'Lloyd George and Nonconformi ty: the Last Rally'. English Historical Review 89 (1974) . 77-108.
is a good account. a fuller version of S.Koss. Nonconfon nity in Modem British Politics (London.
1975). ch. 9.
106 Jones unpublished 'diarv', 26 Jan.. 28 Julv 1935: Dawson diary . 12 June 1935.
107 These included: ll.lm (95.9%) favour ing League membership and 1O.5m (90.6%) for international
disarmament. but also. in the event of military aggress ion by a state. 1O.l m (86.8%) supporting
economic and non-military sanctions. and 6.8111 (58.70/0) prepared 'if necessary! to accept military
measures. The results confirmed thedelicacy of rearmament yet indicated a rhetorical strategy for
advancing it.
108 Cowling. impact ojHitler. pp. 62. 8+-9+. C.T.Stannage. Baldwin Thwarts the Opposition. The British
General Election 0/1935 (London. 1980). is not as helpful here as might appear. Its concentration on
parties and a 'Nuffield election studies' attention to campaign details misses how far the existence of a
National coalition government stimulated a corresponding politics of 'national'. cross-party,
movements. and how the decisive political action took place before the election campaign began.
109 Hoare memo. 21 Aug.1935 . has Cecil saying the Union was 'entirely behind the Government'. and see
memo. 13 Sept. and Hoare to Cecil 16 Sept.l935. accepting a Cecil offer to avoid any embarrassment
to the government by postponing a Union demonstration at the Albert Hall : FO 8001295/116-7. 217.
233. At the Church Congress. 10 Oct.1935. Cecil declared 'uttermost ' support for the government:
The Times. 12 Oct.l935 .
110 Gilbert. Churchill VI3. p.288 (28 July 1936). For evidence that it had this effect. Ashley to local Council
conveno rs. 2+ Oct. 1935. Llovd George papers GII+212 . House of Lords Record Office: Kess. 'Lloyd
George and Ncnconformity'. p. IOO.
II I Ibid.. pp.88-97: Goodman. 'Faded Heritage'. pp.62-3: and sec the vigorous reaction. including resignation
from the National Free Church Council executive. of the general secretary of the Baptist Union. in
W.M.S.West. 'The Reverend Secretary Aubrey. Part I'. Baptist Qunrteriy (1992) . pp.20+-12.
112 The Times. 9 April 1935: Williamson. 'Doctrinal Politics'. pp.205-6. Koss, 'Lloyd George and
Nonconformity'. p.87n l. quotes one religious correspo ndent declaring that Baldwin's appearance at
4S
the conference had 'no politica l significance whatsoever'. But this refers to the Free Church Council's
'non-party political' stance. rather tha n to Baldwin's place in Free Church opinion.
11 3 Berry. and Hughes. to Baldwin. 7. 13 June 1935. Baldwin papers 1 ~ I/l9. 77: The Times. 18 June 1935:
editorial. The Christian World. 20 June 1935: Revs. Carter. Bond and Gregory. The Times. I July
1935: editorial and Rev.J .D.Jones. T7Je Bn tish Week~,.. ~ July 1935. See also Aubrey to Hughes . II
June 1935. in West. 'Aubrey'. p. 207.
I I ~ The Times. 19 June 1935. For Scott Lidgett's break with Lloyd George and declaration of suppo rt for
Baldwin duri ng the gene ral election campaign. see Koss. 'Lloyd George and Nonconformity'. pp.102-
~ .
115 For Free Churchmen admiring Baldwin in these term s. see Willi amson. Baldwin, p. 3~9 .
116 Baldwin. Torch. p.339: the second phrase. endlessly recycled. echoed Viscount Grey. Twenty-Five
rears 1892-1916. 2 vols. (1925 ). i.91. ii.271-9.
117 Jones unpublished 'diary'. 7 Sept.. 12 Oct. 1935: The Times, 2. 9 Oct. 1935. See also the Rev. M .Aubrey to
Baldwin. 28 Oct. 1935. Baldw in papers 3919. congratulating him on the governm ent election
manifesto. Aubrey. Gene ral Secretary of the Baptist Union. had been the leading National Free
Church Council critic of the 'Call to Action'.
118 Editoria ls. The Christian World. 2~ Oct.. I~ Nov. 1935. For the Baptists. see Goodman. 'Faded Heritage'.
pp.65-X.
119 'Notes for Chequers Conversation '. 8 No, '. 1935. CRD 1f7/2~ . Thi s resolves a debate on whether the
content of Baldwin's election speeches could determine if the chief election issues were international
or domestic: Stannage. 'East Fulharn', pp.199-200: J.Robertson. 'TIle Bri tish General Election of
1935'. Journal ofContemporary History 9 (1974) . pp. 159-6~ .
120 Lan g to Baldwin. 13 Dec.1935. Baldwi n papers 1 2 3/2~7 : despite his 'constant desire to do anyt hing to
help you'. he could not 'resist the impulse' to say he was 'beset by anxiety'.
121 HCfJeb 307. cC.203 ~-5 (19 Dec.1935).
122 Edi toria ls. 717e Christian World. 19. 26 Dec. 1935.
46
123 Crucial evidence was first published in The Earl of Birkenhead. Halifax (London. 1965). ppAOO- l. Of the
many accounts. the locus classicus is Cowling. Impact ofllirler, pp.27 1-83. 289-95. and the fullest
details are in ARoberts. 'The Holv Fox'. , I Biography a/Lord Halifax (London. 1991). chs .12-18.
12-1 Contrast Birkenhead. Halifax. ppA22 -3. 606-7. and Roberts. Holv Fox. pp.50. 303--1 , reflecting
contemporary divisions of opinion. e.g . The Diplomatic Diaries ofOttver Harvey / 93 7-19../-0. ed.
I.Harvey (London. 1970). p.12-1. and Chips. He Diaries ofSir Henrv Channon, cd. R.Rhodes James
(London. 1967). pp.23 1. 255-6.
125 Harvey Diplomatic Diaries. p.138 ( I I May 1938).
126 Halifax to Lumley. 21 March 1938. FO 800/328179-81.
127 Henson, Retrospect iiA09-10 (journal. 13. 18 May 1938): Chadwick. Henson, pp.249-53: Halifax 's reply
~ . .
was the speech cited in n.8t.aOOye.
128 See esp. Halifax to Baldwin. 15 Nay.1937. Baldwin papers 173/6 1:Harvey Diplomatic Diaries. p.12! (19
Match 1938).
129 Cowling. Impact ofHitler. pp.9. 272. 291; and see Wood articles . 'The Tory standpoint'. and 'The Church
and Industry'. 1920. Halifax papers A4A 10.7.1. -I. and the interviews reported in Begbie.
Conservative Mind. pp.50-2. 55-7 .
130 H.Dalton. 71,e I'a tejid rears. Memoirs 1931-19-15 (London. 1957) p.188 (diary. 21 Sept.l938).
131 G. Lloyd and E. Wood. The Great Opportunity (London, 1918). p.ll.
132 HLDeb l l O, c. 1-109 (4 Oct. 1938). repeating his letter in that morning's Dailv Telegraph: see C.Forbes
Adam. Lif e ofLord Lloyd (London. 19-18), pp.288-9.
133Harvev Diplomatic Diaries .p.176 (12 Sept. 1938): Lloyd to Halifax. 12 Sept. 1938. FO 800/309/301-4, and
see Cowling, Impact a/Hiller. p.280: J.Channley, Lord Lloyd (London. 1987), pp.218-20.
134 Cecil to Halifax. 23 Sept. 1938. FO 800/328/144: Cadogan Diaries, pp.103-6 (24. 25 Sept. 1938): Minney.
Hore-Belisha Papers. p.146 (diary. 25 Sept. 1938).
135 Halifax Speeches. p.IOO. The address aroused bitter pacifist criticism. as it was recognised to have 'struck
deep' into their position: A Campbell Johnson. J Iscount Halifax (London. 19-1 1). ppA23 --I.
47
l3 6 Halifax Speeches. pp.199-200 (3 Oct.), 202 (24 Oct.). 211-12 (broadcast to USA. 27 Oct.l 938): Harvev
Diplomatic Diaries , p.208 (1 Oct.l938). For impressive private defences. Halifax to Scott. and to Mrs
Lindsay. 12 Oct.. 11 NoY.1 938. Fa 8001328/175-81. 207-9.
137 Harvey Diplomatic Diaries, p.208 (3 Oct.l938). and see pp.264-5 (20 March 1939).
138 Cabinet 43(38). 25 Sept. 1938. quoted in Roberts . Holy Fox. p. 117: Harvev Diplomatic Diaries, pp.198.
202 (26. 29 Sept. (938)
139 Foreign policy committee minutes. 14 NOY. 1938. in Roberts . Hair Fox. p.129: Han el' Diplomatic Diaries.
p.220 (16 Nov, (938).
140 Foreign policy committee minutes. 27 March 1939. in Roberts. Hair Fox. p.IH. and see S. Newman.
.vlarch 1939. The British Guarantee to Poland (Oxford. (976 ). pp.152-3. also p.136. though the
description of this as 'moral hysteria' is over-stated.
141 Halifax Speeches. p.334 (broadcast. 7 Nov.(939). and see pp.261-4. 268-9 (19 Apri l). 312 (24 Aug. (939):
Johnson. Halijax. pp.519-20.
142 Lord Lloyd. The Briti sh Case (London. (939) . pp.9- 10.
143 The Times. 17. 19 Nov.. 9 Dec. 1938, The Earl Baldwin Fund for Refugees raised £522.000 (about fl7m.
in modern terms) from a million donors : see daily subscription lists in ibid.. from 13 Dec. 1938. and
AJ.Shennan. Island Refuge (London. 2nd eda.(994). pp.184-5.
144 Jones. Diary With Letters, ppA24-5 (20 Jan.19 39): Earl Baldwin. An Interpreter ojEngland (London.
(939 ). p.1 18: Halifax Speeches. pp.287 (29 June ). 304-5 (24 Aug.(9 39).
145 Quoted in Wilkinson. Dissent or Conform ? p.187.
146 An earlier generation of historians. without access to private papers. thought this 'impossible to expla in' :
A.l P.Taylor. The Origins a/the Second World War (1961. Hannondsworth 1965 edn.). p.174.
147 Baldwin to Davidson. 11 April 1938. in K.MiddIemas and lBarnes. Baldwin (London. (969). pp,1043-4:
Harvey Diplomatic Diaries. pp.126-30 (13. 22 April 1938).
148 Mrs Chamberlain to Lang. 4 Nov.1941. Lang papers 191/322-7, partly quoted in Lockhart. Lang. ppA26-
7. Lang's statement that Chamberlain came to rely on the 'help of God' may have been less descriptive
than a comfort for his devoutly Anglican widow.
149 /fCDeb 339. cc.Ll . 45. 551-2 (3, 6 Oct. 1938).
48
150 Harvel' Diplomatic Diaries. pp.128. 139. 1-10 (22 April. 12. 19 May 1938).
15 1 HCDeh 335. c.5-15. and Attlcc CC. 6-15-51 (2 May 1935): N. to H.Chamberlain. 8 May 1938. NC
1811 /1050.
152 H.Wilson memo.. 30 May 1938. PRO PREM 1/251: The Leo Amerv Diaries ii. 1929-45. cd. LBarncs and
D.Nieholson (London. 1988). p.532 (2 1 Oc1.1938)
153 Lang. Lockhart. pp.-l30: Chadwick. Henson. pp.309-12: Halifax dia ry. 22 July 19-10 .
15-1 To the Ashridge Fellowship. The Times . 3 Dec. 193-1 .
